

A Tragic Beginning

*The Taiwan Uprising
of February 28, 1947*

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CHAPTER 4

The Uprising

AS WE HAVE SEEN, tensions between Taiwanese and Mainlanders did not escalate in a uniform, linear way. Instead, the Uprising involved a series of violent actions taken by crowds expressing grievances and anger arising from the tensions described in the previous chapter. Erupting like a flash fire, the Uprising was triggered by a street disturbance that attracted crowds, who soon directed their anger at provincial government buildings, persons, and vehicles. The following table (Table 9) presents a brief chronology of the day-to-day events, which lasted roughly two weeks and involved a large part of the urban population.

As the Uprising progressed, a series of meetings and negotiations were held to consider the choice between violent confrontation and conciliation. The first of these meetings began no later than Friday evening, February 28, and involved Governor-General Ch'en I's own Executive Office and other administrative offices; different groups elected the previous April (especially the Taiwan Provincial Council and the Taipei City Council); local organizations, such as those formed in schools or universities or by merchants; and a sequence of newly formed committees, especially the famous "Resolution Committees" (*ch'u-li wei-yüan-hui*). The meetings were often attended by audiences of a hundred or more angry citizens expressing the rage felt by those in the streets. The process itself often evoked misunderstanding and anger and overcame efforts to conduct negotiations calmly and reach a speedy, peaceful end to the Uprising.

The chief problem was that of finding a common ground between Governor-General Ch'en I's administration and the different groups that more or less spoke for the crowds in the streets. Although Governor-General Ch'en I eventually agreed to a number of the dissidents' basic demands, he could not agree to the more revolutionary ones. Moreover, dissident actions in the streets or in other cities were often at odds with the views expressed in the Resolution Committees. That the demands escalated and took on a revolutionary character is indisputable—and that in itself explains the breakdown of the negotiations.

TABLE 9
The February 28, 1947, Uprising: A Chronological Outline

- February 27 (Thursday):
 Evening incident takes place at T'ai-p'ing Street in Taipei.
 Angry crowd gathers at Taipei Police Bureau.
 Violence begins in Keelung.
- February 28 (Friday):
 More crowd violence occurs in Taipei.
 The Incident takes place at the Taiwan Provincial Administrative Office.
 Mainlanders flee Taipei.
 In the evening, the Taipei City Council meets in the first of many meetings about the crisis.
 Governor-General Ch'en I begins to favor conciliation.
 Martial law is imposed.
 Violence begins in Pan-ch'iao, T'ao-yüan, and Taichung.
- March 1 (Saturday):
 More crowd violence occurs in Taipei.
 Taipei City Council organizes the first Resolution Committee.
 At 5:00 P.M., Governor-General Ch'en I makes a broadcast promising that martial law will be lifted, and victims and their families compensated.
- March 2 (Sunday):
 Martial law is lifted at 12:00 A.M.
 Meeting in Chung-shan Auditorium, Taipei, at 9:00 A.M., results in more radical demands.
 Resolution Committee meets in Taipei at 2:50 P.M.
 Governor-General Ch'en I, at 3:00 P.M., makes a conciliatory broadcast. Wang T'ien-teng then broadcasts denunciation of Governor-General Ch'en I.
 Taichung radicals elect as chairperson the Communist Hsieh Hsüeh-hung.
 Chia-i and Tainan uprisings begin.
- March 3 (Monday):
 Resolution Committee meeting in Taipei moves to set up a self-defense corps.
 Executive Office agrees to requests made by Resolution Committee.
 Uprising begins in city of Kaohsiung.
- March 4 (Tuesday):
 Taipei Resolution Committee becomes increasingly radical.
 Governor-General Ch'en I warns that demands must be limited to local administrative matters.
 Order is restored in T'ao-yüan.
 Revolutionary demands are made in Hua-lien.
- March 5 (Wednesday):
 Alliance of Youth for the Self-Government of Taiwan meets in Taipei's Chung-shan Auditorium and calls for self-rule and elections.
 Three ROC destroyers arrive in Keelung.
 Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek plans to send Twenty-first Division to Taiwan.
- March 6 (Thursday):
 Governor-General Ch'en I's third broadcast is again conciliatory; Taiwan Provincial Council telegraphs Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to explain the Uprising and suggests ways to end the riots.
 General P'eng Meng-chi tries to restore order in Kaohsiung, in a massacre that goes on for days.
- March 7 (Friday):
 Taipei Resolution Committee issues radical 32 Demands.
 Taiwan Self-Governing Alliance's branch is established in Hua-lien.

TABLE 9
Continued

- March 8 (Saturday):
 Taipei Resolution Committee retreats to take a conciliatory position.
 Crowds engage in violence in Taipei-Keelung area.
 First reinforcements arrive—in Keelung, at night.
 Ministry of Defense in Nanking plans reforms once order restored.
- March 9 (Sunday):
 Nationalist troops arrive in Keelung after 12:00 A.M.
 Fukien and Taiwan Censor Yang Liang-kung arrives.
 Martial law is reimposed at 6:00 A.M.
 An order requires that all Resolution Committees be disbanded.
 Order is restored in Pan-ch'iao.
- March 10 (Monday):
 Two army divisions arrive in Kaohsiung.
 Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek publicly denounces "32 Demands" of March 7, adopting a stern tone.
 Governor-General Ch'en I publicly condemns "seditious" behavior in Taiwan.
- March 11 (Tuesday):
 Tainan uprising ends, as well as much of the Taichung uprising.
 Governor-General Ch'en I publicly denounces Taipei Resolution Committee for issuing 32 Demands of March 7.
- March 17 (Monday):
 Taichung uprising ends.
 Governor-General Ch'en I offers to resign.
- March 21:
 All fighting has ceased.
- May 15:
 Wei Tao-ming replaces Governor-General Ch'en I as head of the Taiwan Provincial Government.

Although P'eng Ming-min and others later charged that Governor-General Ch'en I was negotiating in bad faith, we do not think that the evidence supports this thesis. The series of proposals he made, some of which were broadcast over the radio, strike us as serious ones, but the chief point is that his own interests would have been best served by a quick and peaceful resolution of the crisis.

There is little doubt that the Uprising embarrassed Ch'en I in the eyes of his superiors and that he dreaded asking them to transfer troops badly needed on the Mainland back to Taiwan. The only alternative for Ch'en I, if he was to keep the KMT in power, was conciliation with the dissidents. Regardless of the governor-general's position, however, some of the dissidents' demands would never have been acceptable to the central government. To understand the nature of the demands, we can divide them into three categories.

Demands falling into the first category were made by those who wanted

the government to accept responsibility for its violent actions from February 27 on, make amends for them, and promise not to take similar actions in the future. Dissidents asked that the government apologize, guarantee that no such incidents would occur again, punish guilty officials, compensate victims' families, bring a wider circle of citizens into the investigative process, and so on. We shall call these demands ones emphasizing the government's culpability.

The second category of demands involved restriction of the government's power to act coercively against dissidents. Advocates of this viewpoint asked that the government end martial law and press censorship, release all suspects and enact an amnesty, restrict the movement of troops or use of their weapons, and so on.

The third category focused on the restructuring of the polity or even on the transfer of power from the KMT to people who viewed themselves as the true representatives of the Taiwanese. The request that the government employ more Taiwanese was, of course, a common one, but there were also demands for self-rule, including the suspension or abolition of the government's police or military units and the delegation of police powers to certain citizen groups. Taiwanese with this viewpoint increasingly demanded immediate democratization of the government in a way that would effectively end the central government's ability to impose policies on the Taiwanese. Because such demands would have in effect ended the sovereign authority of the ROC in Taiwan, they can be called "revolutionary."

The following account shows that Governor-General Ch'en I was willing to make concessions about government culpability and even about restriction of the government's power to act coercively. (For example, he ended martial law on Sunday, March 2.) The dissidents, however, did not limit their demands to the first two categories and began to insist on a revolutionary political solution, which led them to ignore Governor-General Ch'en's concessions. This unrealistic attitude is reminiscent of the euphoria with which Taiwanese greeted the ROC forces in 1945, expecting the rapid realization of a sympathetic government and a prosperous economy. Our evidence demonstrates that as the crisis developed, wiser people on both sides sought compromise but could not prevail—a familiar situation in modern Chinese history.

The Uprising Begins: Taipei

At 11:00 A.M. on Thursday, February 27, 1947, the Taipei City Monopoly Bureau received a secret report that a boat near the little port of


Tamsui was carrying some fifty boxes of illegal matches and cigarettes. Even such a small shipment could elicit a major police effort, and in fact the Bureau immediately dispatched six investigators and four uniformed policemen to the scene.¹ When the team arrived, it found only five boxes of cigarettes. Later, the Bureau received another secret report that the missing contraband was being sold at the T'ien-ma Tea Store on T'ai-p'ing Street in Taipei (now called Yen-p'ing North Road). (See Map 4.) Smugglers were known to frequent the T'ai-p'ing Street area, so the investigative team drove there, ate an early supper at the Hsiao-hsiang-yüan Restaurant on T'ai-p'ing Street, and then, probably sometime between 7:30 and 8:00 P.M., went to the store, only to discover that the dealers had fled.

The investigators then saw a forty-year-old widow, Lin Chiang-mai, selling what they thought were contraband cigarettes. Not even a solitary peddler could escape the attention of officials, and the team demanded that she hand the contraband over. The widow Lin replied, "If you confiscate everything, I will not be able to eat. At least let me have my money and the cigarettes provided by the Monopoly Bureau." When the investigators refused, Lin grabbed hold of one of them, who reacted by hitting her on the head with the butt of his pistol, producing a bleeding gash. Lin's daughter began to cry, and some of the crowd that had now gathered began to taunt the team, screaming, "You unreasonable *a-shan*, you evil pigs, return her cigarettes!"² One of the investigators, Fu Hsüeh-t'ung, tried to flee. He took out his pistol, brandished it, and then fired, hitting a bystander named Ch'en Wen-hsi, who was reported to be the brother of a major hoodlum. Ch'en later died. The investigators managed to escape, but the angry crowd burned their abandoned vehicle and then went to the nearby police station to demand that the investigator who had fired the pistol be summarily executed.

At 9:00 P.M. on that same evening, Li Chiung-chih, the head of the Monopoly Bureau's General Affairs Committee, and Yang Tzu-ts'ai, the head of that committee's Fourth Section, drove to the scene to investigate. When they arrived, a crowd gathered around Li's vehicle and began beating upon it. Li and Yang immediately drove to the Taipei Police Bureau.

As news of the incident began to spread, a crowd of six or seven hundred people converged on the Police Bureau. Protected by the staff of the bureau, Li and Yang tried to explain to the crowd that the guilty investigator would be severely punished, but the crowd demanded that all the investigators be handed over to them. Li and Yang refused, saying that Police Chief Ch'en Sung-chien would send the six investigators to Military Police Headquarters. When the crowd demanded that the guilty investigator be executed the very next day, Li and Yang responded by saying,

Map 4. Taipei City, 1947.



* Location where "incident" occurred, February 27, 1947
 ▲ Governor-General Ch'en I's headquarters

"Punishment will be meted out according to the crime committed. The law is very clear; we will not act without proper authority." Li and Yang repeated their position, but they failed to convince the crowd, who still refused to disperse. Some of the younger people began chanting, "The Taiwanese want revenge now!" and "Anyone who does not come out and assemble is not a real Taiwanese!"³

As these cries reverberated into the night, some of the crowd then moved to the office of *T'ai-wan hsin-sheng-pao* (*The Taiwan New Life Daily*), where they demanded that the paper report the incident. Someone told the crowd that the publisher, Li Wan-chü, was out of the office, but Wu Chin-lien, the chief editor, told them that the administration's Propaganda Commission had just ordered him not to report the incident. At that point, the crowd threatened to burn down the newspaper's office building, whereupon Wu suddenly produced Li Wan-chü, who assured the crowd that the incident would be printed. The account appeared in the next day's edition with only a short (one hundred characters) account.

Meanwhile, the crowd on T'ai-p'ing Street grew larger and angrier as people talked among themselves. A large group began to assemble at the Military Police Headquarters, and another group at the Taipei Police Bureau demanded that the guilty investigators be severely punished. People began beating drums and spreading news of the incident around the city.

By Friday morning, February 28, characters for "China" (*Chung-kuo*) had been removed from signs on the China Hotel and the Bank of China, and a banner in Japanese appeared, reading "Down with Military Tyranny."⁴ By 9:00 A.M., people began to assemble at the Lung-shan Temple and along T'ai-p'ing Street, beating gongs and asking storekeepers to close their shops. Some shouted slogans demanding that Taiwan's 6 million people rebel.⁵ Others, crying "Stop all prohibitions on cigarettes from abroad" and "Abolish the Monopoly Bureau," assembled at Erh-mu p'ai-ch'u-so, one of the police stations on T'ai-p'ing Street. When the precinct director of police, Huang, fired his weapon into the air to disperse the people outside the station, the crowd beat him, smashed glass windows, and entered the station and destroyed equipment.⁶

At about this time, Taipei's mayor, Yu Mi-chien, the Speaker of the City Council, Chou Yen-shou, and the chief of the Military Police, Chang Mu-t'ao, arrived to try to disperse the mob around the police station. These officials assured the people that the government would punish the guilty investigators, but the crowd shouted that they should be executed.

Around noon on Friday, February 28, a mob attacked a branch office of the Monopoly Bureau, beating two officials to death and seriously injuring four others. The mob burned the bureau's stocks of cigarettes, matches,

and wine, as well as a vehicle and seven or eight bicycles. Office furniture and equipment were placed in the middle of the street and burned. The spectacle attracted many onlookers. When military and uniformed police arrived, they were unable to control the mob and quickly retreated.

The headquarters of the Monopoly Bureau, located at the city's south gate, became the next target. Officials there, who had already learned about the fate of their colleagues, had boarded up their doors and windows. When the mob arrived, the people could express their anger only by pounding on the doors and shattering the windows.

Around 1:00 P.M., four or five hundred people, led by individuals beating gongs and drums, threaded their way to the Taiwan Provincial Administrative Executive Office, situated in the middle of the city (see Map 4). The group gathered more and more people along the way, and soon crowds stretched from Ch'en I's headquarters to what is now Yen-p'ing North Road. Still more people were lined up from the city's north gate to the downtown bus station.

By 2:00 P.M., a mob had occupied the Taiwan radio station, broadcasting an appeal to the people to gather at the New Park and then march to the headquarters of the Taiwan Provincial Administrative Executive Office. Taiwan at the time had some 100,000 radio sets, and the broadcast must have had a wide impact. Only a few guards were on duty at the Executive Office headquarters, so they sent out an urgent call for police reinforcements from the Botanical Gardens⁷ while trying to disperse the crowd and protect the office. Shots rang out, killing two people and injuring several others. This event became known as the Incident at the Square (*Kuang-ch'ang shih-chien*).⁸

As the news of the incident spread, people in the streets began to use Japanese to question passersby. Mainlanders who did not know how to reply in Japanese were beaten and cursed with cries (in the Minnan dialect) of "Beat the a-shan!" or "Kill the pigs!" (*tai di*).⁹ Learning of these attacks, Mainlanders began to flee the city. The crowds refused to disperse and return home, children left school, shopkeepers bolted their doors, and government personnel closed their offices and fled.

Meanwhile, acts of violence against anything related to "China" or the "Chinese" had spread throughout the city. In the early afternoon on Friday, a Shanghai journalist, Wang K'ang, stood in his hotel room across from the Taipei Railway Station and observed mobs of Taiwanese beating up and even killing Mainlanders who happened to emerge from the railway station or be strolling along the streets.

Some Mainlanders were beaten on the head, and blood flowed; some had fallen to the ground and were gasping for breath. Just at that same moment, a passenger

train had disgorged its passengers. Some of them, Mainlanders, had just emerged from the railway station only to be beaten severely; many were wounded and others killed. They never knew why they were attacked. There were two military men dressed in their uniforms strolling hand in hand down the street. They were quickly surrounded by Taiwanese, who used their fists and rocks to beat them. They were bleeding severely and groaning in pain, and the crowd still continued to beat them.¹⁰

Mobs attacked the Cheng-hua Hotel on Pen Street, broke the doors and windows, and took the furniture outside and burned it. Other mobs went to Piao Street, burned the shops and wares of a number of Chinese merchants, and set fire to more than ten vehicles. Whenever the crowds could identify Mainlanders, officials, or military and civil police, they beat them. The district chief of Hsin-chu, Chu Wen-po, who had arrived in Taipei that day, was badly beaten. Around 5:00 P.M., mobs took the merchandise of the Hsin-t'ai Trading Company out into Jung Street and burned it.¹¹

People began shouting slogans like "Down with Ch'en I's Commercial Trading Company!" "Let Taiwan Rule Itself!" "Let's Have a New Democracy!" and "Abolish the Monopoly Bureau!"¹² The people who had occupied the city's radio station that day made broadcasts asking the public to attack corrupt officials: "The provincial government's corrupt officials and underlings are all in it together with the military police and local officials. They allow our rice to be sent abroad, so that the people do not have enough grain and are dying of starvation. Since we are dying of starvation, why not rise up and survive?"¹³ Among the prominent officials singled out for attack in these broadcasts were Pao K'o-yung, head of the Department of Industry and Mining; Yen Chia-kan, head of the Department of Finance; Chou I-o, head of the Department of Civil Affairs; and Ko Ching-en, Chief Secretary-General of the Executive Office.¹⁴

People in the nearby cities of Keelung and Pan-ch'iao heard the appeals broadcast from Taipei and were drawn into the violence. In these cities, people poured into the streets to beat Mainlanders, destroy their shops, and burn the dormitories of Mainland officials and police.¹⁵ Those who could not speak Japanese or the Taiwanese dialect were beaten, some so severely that they later died.¹⁶ People shouted, "Rice is expensive because the Mainlanders are eating all of it. The Mainlanders have only come to cheat us, and we are now worse off!"¹⁷

Earlier that Friday, the government had responded to the escalating violence by announcing that martial law would begin on Saturday. Friday evening, however, the Executive Office broadcast that martial law would not be declared in order to reduce tensions in Taipei. (Martial law was in fact declared and then lifted on Sunday.)

Meanwhile, that same Friday, five representatives of the city's tobacco sellers' association demanded that the Taipei City Council mediate with the government to end the violence. At this emergency meeting of the City Council, the group agreed that Huang Ch'ao-ch'in, the Speaker of the Taiwan Provincial Council, should meet with Ch'en I to resolve the situation. Many also urged that Huang present Ch'en I with five demands, all of which fell into the category of what we have called "culpability": the guilty investigators must be publicly executed; the Monopoly Bureau must compensate the victims' families; the authorities must guarantee that a similar incident would never occur again; the Monopoly Bureau must meet with delegates of the people and apologize; and the provincial government must dismiss the director of the Monopoly Bureau.

The city council also appointed the council's speaker, Chou Yen-shou, to present similar demands to K'ö Yüan-fen, the Chief of the General Staff of the Taiwan Provincial Garrison Command. K'ö Yüan-fen in turn took their demands to Governor-General Ch'en I, who rejected all but the second one.¹⁸ As Ch'en I realized how serious the crisis was, however, he began to reverse himself. He organized a new committee that evening, headed by Huang Ch'ao-ch'in, to explore the possibility of compensating all victims of the violence.¹⁹

Following these initiatives to restore order, the Speaker of the City Council, Chou Yen-shou, the Speaker of the Provincial Council, Huang Ch'ao-ch'in, the Chief of the General Staff of the Taiwan Provincial Garrison Command, K'ö Yüan-fen, and an independent (non-KMT) member of the provincial delegation to the National Assembly, the physician Hsieh O, met at the Taipei radio station around 7:30 P.M. to appeal over the air for public calm. K'ö deplored the beatings of Mainlanders, and he offered suggestions about how the Taiwan Provincial Administrative Executive Office might restore law and order.

First, those who broke the law in investigating this smuggling of contraband will be severely punished, so that this kind of incident will not happen again. Second, because certain violent agitators have aggravated the incident and endangered public security, the commander-in-chief has imposed martial law to restore peace and harmony. When order has been restored, martial law immediately will be lifted.²⁰

In their comments, Huang and Chou expressed the hope that the people could negotiate a solution with the government. Hsieh O urged the people to remain calm. All three reported that representatives of the Taipei City Council and the Executive Office had been negotiating. However, they

misled the people by claiming that the government had accepted the council's demands to abolish the Monopoly Bureau and by announcing that the government would compensate victims, when Governor-General Ch'en had agreed only to explore the possibility. Because of an erroneous report that Hsieh and the city council believed, another mistake was made: Hsieh said that no one had been killed or injured by the shots fired by the soldiers in front of the Executive Office.²¹ Immediately after the broadcast, Hsieh received a telephone call informing her that shots fired by the soldiers that afternoon had caused several deaths and injuries. Although she returned immediately to the microphone and conveyed that new information to the public, the damage had been done. Some people considered her a liar who was trying to cover up the incident for the government. Indeed, the next morning a crowd went to Hsieh's hospital building and took medical instruments and her personal furniture into the street and burned them. Fortunately, Hsieh was not there at the time.

Thus, these first, stumbling efforts to achieve conciliation failed. Despite the quiet streets in the early hours of Saturday morning, March 1, the fury of the people had not abated. In this tense situation, the Taipei City Council convened at 10:00 A.M. and invited delegates from the Taiwan Provincial Council and other organizations to meet at Chung-shan Auditorium to set up a committee to investigate the recent violence. The Taipei Resolution Committee had been born. Huang Ch'ao-ch'in, Wang T'ien-teng, Lin Chung, and Chou Yen-shou were asked to submit to the Executive Office a resolution containing five demands. These five demands fell somewhere between our categories of culpability and restriction of government power: The government must suspend martial law, immediately release all people being detained, order the military not to fire, establish a committee of government and popular representatives to investigate the Incident, and ask Governor-General Ch'en I to make a public broadcast.²² Ch'en I went on the air and said that all those who had been arrested, regardless of the violence they had perpetrated, would be released, if their families and the neighborhood watchdog associations (the *lin* and *li*) guaranteed in writing that they would not make any more trouble. For the first time, he also definitely agreed to compensation for victims of the *Kuang-ch'ang shih-chien*. The government would compensate families with a 200,000 old Taiwan dollar payment for each person killed and with 50,000 old Taiwan dollars for each person who had been wounded.²³

However, leaders could not move fast enough to keep up with events in the streets. That same Saturday morning, some people began to orga-

nize demonstrations to oppose the government. They wrote placards and signs in large characters: "Down with Ch'en I's Empire!" "Abolish the Governor-General's Executive Office!" "Down with Tyranny!" "The Taiwanese People Should Immediately Rise Up, Struggle for Their Bread, and Fight for Freedom and Democracy!" "Don't Compromise—Use Only Armed Struggle!" and "We Will Use Guns Against Guns!"²⁴ At 2:00 P.M., mobs attacked the Taipei Railway Police station, and many on both sides were wounded.²⁵

At 5:00 P.M. Saturday, Ch'en I made a public broadcast, declaring that the tobacco smuggling case had already been turned over to the judiciary for investigation. He added that the provincial government would compensate families whose members had been wounded or killed. Martial law would be lifted Sunday, March 2, at 12:00 midnight, but all strikes, demonstrations, and meetings were prohibited.²⁶ The arrested would be released if families and watchdog associations vouched for them. He also promised that delegates of the Taiwan Provincial Council would be given an opportunity to meet with representatives of the Governor-General's Executive Office to resolve the current troubles, and asked that new recommendations be discussed by those delegates. He insisted, however, that there be no further disturbances. Governor-General Ch'en then announced the names of the five representatives from the government side to sit on the Resolution Committee: Jen Hsien-ch'ün, head of the Department of Transportation; Chou I-o, head of the Department of Civil Affairs; Chao Lien-fang, head of the Department of Agriculture and Forestry; Pao K'o-yung, head of the Department of Industry and Mining; and Hu Fu-hsiang, head of the Police Department. As we have seen, at least two of these officials, Chou and Pao, were the objects of considerable popular resentment. Ch'en I obviously was aware of this fact, but given his temperament—unswerving support of his subordinates and adherence to principle—it is not surprising that Ch'en I would ignore public sentiment, particularly when he believed he had countered dissident demands with conciliatory measures of his own.

As promised, the Executive Office did lift martial law at 12:00 A.M. on Sunday, March 2. Yet peace did not return to the city. Armed patrols exacerbated existing tensions, and some people even claimed to have attacked the police headquarters on this day.²⁷

On Sunday, too, there were more meetings. At 9:00 A.M., delegates from the Taiwan Provincial Council, the Taipei City Council, and the Political Alliance Association, together with members of the National Assembly, met at Chung-shan Auditorium. Out of this meeting came five recommendations: leaders of neighborhood watchdog associations (*lin*

and *li*) would provide written guarantees for the good conduct of all individuals arrested in return for the latter's release; the government would pay compensation for all deaths and injuries; it would grant amnesty to all persons connected with the riots; it would promptly restore full public transportation service (Chien Wen-fa, a member of the National Assembly, was elected to see that this task was completed); and it would allow representatives from labor, farmer and student associations to join the new Resolution Committee. Another recommendation was added requesting that two more delegates representing the government be added to the Resolution Committee: General K'o Yüan-fen, and Chang Mu-t'ao, the head of the Military Police.²⁸

These demands, which can be classified in our category of government culpability, were not far from the views expressed by Governor-General Ch'en I in his public broadcast on Saturday at 5:00 P.M. Shortly thereafter, however, the delegates added two more demands—that the governor abolish the police brigade and end press censorship. These fell into the category of restricting the government's coercive powers.

When the Resolution Committee met later on Sunday, it agreed to establish five subcommittees to facilitate negotiations: first, a liaison committee made up of Huang Ch'ao-ch'in, Lin Chung, Li Wan-chü, Chou Yen-shou, and Wu Kuo-hsin; second, an information committee of Wang T'ien-teng, Lin Tsung-hsien, Chang Ch'ing-chuan, and Lin Jih-kao; third, a relief and protection committee of Tu Ts'ung-ming, Chou Pai-lien, Huang Ch'ao-sheng, and Hsieh O; fourth, an investigation committee of Wu Ch'un-lin, Lo Shui-yüan, Hsü Chen-ch'ing, Li Jen-kuei, Ch'en Wu, Huang Huo-ting, Ch'en Hai-ho, Lin Shui-t'ien, Chien Sheng-yü, and Lin Ch'ao-ming; and finally, a general affairs committee of P'an Ch'ü-yüan, Ch'en Ken-huo, Wu Yu-k'o, Ch'en Pi-nan, Wang Kuei, Lin Chang-en, and Hsü Ch'ing-feng.²⁹

The dissidents, however, did not unify around the Resolution Committee. Different groups repeatedly held new meetings and made demands that had not been considered by the committee. On Sunday, while the Resolution Committee was setting up its elaborate structure of subcommittees, various student leaders joined with the Political Construction Association (*Cheng-chih chien-she hsieh-hui*), headed by Chiang Wei-ch'uan, to resolve the crisis. The Political Construction Association had been formed in late 1945 to assist the central government, undertake the development of Taiwan province, and initiate reforms. The young people represented a variety of student associations from Taipei's institutions of higher learning (National Taiwan University, the Law and Commercial College, the Normal College, and Yen-p'ing College) and from many of its high schools.

The meeting in Chung-shan Auditorium on Sunday at 10:00 A.M. was

attended by thousands of students. Most supported the anti-Ch'en I sentiments of the people of Taipei and criticized the governor-general as well as denouncing the provincial government's management of education. Some shouted slogans like "Political democracy!" "Self-rule for Taiwan!" and "Educational freedom!"³⁰ Others even urged that students obtain arms and immediately attack Ch'en I's headquarters. Student demands were thus escalating in the direction of revolution. After the meeting ended, the Political Construction Association's chairman, Chiang Wei-ch'uan, and several others talked to Ch'en I, urging him to end the disturbances quickly and to meet with additional representatives from the newly organized Resolution Committee.

At 2:50 P.M. that same Sunday, March 2, the Resolution Committee met on the third floor of the Chung-shan Auditorium building. Chou Yen-shou and other committee members presided over this meeting, which was attended by hundreds of citizens. Again, those favoring conciliation were outnumbered. Chang Ch'ing-ch'uan reported on his one-hour meeting with Ch'en I at 9:00 A.M. that morning. He said that the governor-general had promised to consider the recommendations the Resolution Committee had made on Saturday and would strengthen the Resolution Committee's role: "Ch'en I promised to broaden the committee by including representatives of commercial associations, workers, students, the masses and the Political Construction Association, so that their opinions could be heard."³¹

Chou Yen-shou then reported on the Executive Office's response to the five recommendations presented to Ch'en I earlier that day and to the two additional ones that the governor-general abolish the police brigade and end press censorship.³² Chou stated that the Executive Office had agreed to consider these recommendations, but that it did not have the authority to act immediately on all of them. Someone in the crowd then demanded that the criminals in the Monopoly Bureau and the police brigade be brought forward and photographed by the press. Another stood up and demanded that a greater number of Taiwanese be employed for important positions in the government.³³

Around this time, at 3:00 P.M. on Sunday, March 2, Governor-General Ch'en I made a second radio broadcast, in which he promised to "do more to implement steps to make the people feel secure and to speedily restore harmony." Then he set forth his recommendations for resolving the crisis. They went far toward meeting the demands we have categorized under culpability:

As for those who participated in this incident whom the government considers as having simply lost their senses, the government will exercise leniency and release

them. Second, as for those who participated in this incident and were arrested by officials or the military police, the government will be lenient and send them to the military police headquarters, where they will be released to their families or relatives; the neighborhood watchdog associations will not have to vouch for them, so we can avoid that inconvenience. Third, as for all those killed or wounded, no matter whether they were officials, educators, or ordinary people, and regardless of whether they were Taiwanese or Mainlanders, the wounded will be assisted and the dead will be compensated. Fourth, as to a final resolution of this incident, additional representatives from various groups of the people will be added to the Resolution Committee, so that more opinions can be heard.³⁴

Governor-General Ch'en then said he loved Taiwan and the Taiwanese people and wanted to restore the harmony that had prevailed before February 27. He hoped that the people and the government would cooperate and work together even harder to realize a spiritual accord.³⁵

After Ch'en I's radio broadcast, Wang T'ien-teng of the Resolution Committee went on the air and rejected Ch'en's attempt at conciliation. After denouncing Ch'en I and the provincial government, he praised as revolutionary martyrs citizens who had died while attacking Mainlander stores or beating or killing Mainlanders. Promising that the blood of these martyrs had not been shed in vain, Wang threatened that another crisis would erupt, and more blood would flow if the government did not speedily resolve the present crisis.³⁶

Yet peace gradually returned to Taipei by early Monday morning, March 3. Shopkeepers began opening their doors and city buses operated once again. However, the price of rice in stores and markets had skyrocketed.³⁷ At 10:00 A.M. Monday, the Resolution Committee again met at Chung-shan Auditorium to discuss how to achieve a number of goals: freedom for those still under arrest, an end to the armed patrols still roaming the city, the prevention of the few troops that were in Hsin-chu district from leaving and entering the city, the organization of groups of self-defense forces, and the transmission of news of the Incident to the central government and the outside world.

Representatives from the students and self-defense brigades asked that three student association delegates, another delegate each from the labor, farmer, and women's associations, and two more from the Youth Association, as well as Liu Ming-ch'ao of the National Assembly, Lin Chung of the National Council, and Wang T'ien-teng of the Taiwan Provincial Council, meet with Ch'en I and present their opinions to the governor-general. The Resolution Committee also elected Lin Tsung-hsien, Lin Shih-tang, Lü Po-hsiung, Lo Shui-yüan, and Li Wan-chü to go to the United States Consulate and ask it to inform the outside world of the Uprising, but this group never carried out that mission. The Committee then gave Hsü Te-

hui the responsibility of organizing a self-defense corps of hundreds of thousands of people from around the island to help maintain order.³⁸

On Monday, then, the Resolution Committee was beginning to undertake functions on its own, moving from the issue of culpability to that of restricting ROC powers. The delegates quickly organized two new groups separate from the Resolution Committee: the Provisional Committee for Maintaining Order in Taipei City (*T'ai-pei-shih lin-shih chih-an wei-yüan-hui*) and the Righteous Service Corps (*Chung-i fu-wu-tui*). The former would organize activities to restore law and order to Taipei city, and the latter would implement the activities. The Righteous Service Corps was assigned a leader, Hsü Te-hui, a secretary, and committees for general services, investigation, transportation, and communications and management.³⁹

At 11:00 A.M. on March 3, a delegation from the Resolution Committee, including five delegates representing the people, three students, four youth representatives, one from the women's association, and one each from the National Assembly, the National Council, and the Taiwan Provincial Council, along with Chiang Wei-ch'uan and Lin Wu-ts'un, went to the Executive Office to request that "the government stop all armed patrols in the city, prohibit the police from discharging their weapons, and abolish the military police brigade."⁴⁰ Surprisingly, the government agreed to the first two requests and rejected only the last,⁴¹ and the delegates and government officials went on to reach agreement on seven other issues:⁴²

1. Military troops should be recalled to their units by 6:00 P.M. that same day (March 3).
2. Responsibility for local order should be maintained by the civil and military police; students and youth organizations should be set up to preserve law and order.
3. All transportation should be restored by 6:00 P.M., and the people should protect transportation (traffic) workers.
4. To solve the rice problem, all reserves of military food grain should be distributed to the general public.
5. If violence still continued after military troops had been recalled, the Chief of the General Staff, General K'ö Yüan-fen, should deal with matters and take full responsibility.
6. If people were still being beaten and property destroyed after military units had been withdrawn, twenty representatives should take full responsibility for those disturbances.
7. The people of Taipei should not believe rumors—for example, that troops from the south would be dispatched to the north.

In the evening of the same day, March 3, General K'ö Yüan-fen made a radio broadcast to the people and the military throughout Taiwan. It reflected a desire to avoid confrontation with the now increasingly assertive Resolution Committee:

I hope that harmony will prevail in central and southern Taiwan, that order can immediately be restored to Taiwan, and that all rioting and demonstrations against Mainlanders will cease. All troops will return to their units and are ordered not to come out. All disturbances should immediately cease. Peace will be maintained by the civil and military police. This incident will be investigated by the Resolution Committee. At the same time, I hope that everyone in Taiwan can cooperate and work together to restore the harmony that we once had.⁴³

At 10:00 A.M. on Tuesday, March 4, the Resolution Committee met again. Discussions continued into the early afternoon as student representatives animatedly discussed the previous days' events, and delegates hammered out eight new resolutions. The focus was now on restricting the ROC's coercive powers and on setting up an island-wide Resolution Committee that would serve as a kind of government structure outside the ROC:⁴⁴

1. Taipei city bus service should be immediately restored.
2. The Garrison Command should prohibit armed patrols throughout the island.
3. Huang Ch'ao-ch'in, Chang Ch'ing-chuan, and Yen Ch'in-hsien should ask the Chief of the General Staff, K'ö Yüan-feng, to put an end to the way armed troops have been driving through the city.
4. When troops drive out from their camps to shop for rice and groceries, their vehicles should carry flags, and the soldiers should be unarmed.
5. Regarding the seizure of the Min-hsiung Broadcast Station by the people, the Resolution Committee should make an announcement to present a single story in order to avoid confusion.
6. Based on the district or city councils (in all seventeen districts or cities throughout the island), the Resolution Committees should organize branch committees as soon as possible. Representatives from these branch committees should go to Taipei for consultation.
7. Do not permanently appoint the Resolution Committee chairperson; instead, have the Taipei City Council Speaker temporarily serve in that position.
8. All information should carry the same message, so all fliers and posters should be banned.

On Tuesday afternoon at 2:00 P.M., the Resolution Committee recon-

vened at Chung-shan Auditorium. It urged people not to beat up or insult soldiers who left their units to buy rice and vegetables, and debated a number of issues. At the end of the meeting, the committee agreed that “the province, districts and cities should hold popular elections, and the government should immediately carry out reforms.”⁴⁵

Many people, however, did not want to leave matters in the hands of the Resolution Committee. Tuesday morning, March 4, at 9:00 A.M., crowds of students had already gathered at Chung-shan Auditorium to discuss how to deal with the issue of public safety. After much debate, they resolved that “the students should be organized into a large brigade for preserving public order.”⁴⁶

By 10:00 A.M. Tuesday, Ch'en Ch'i, Chiang Wei-ch'uan, Lin Wu-ts'un, and some forty student and popular representatives presented their views to Governor-General Ch'en I and tried to explain why the disturbances had occurred:


First, for over a year the political and economic policies that have been carried out have failed to embody the governor-general's [Ch'en I's] ideals. This failure created various contradictions and confusions and caused considerable unemployment; the Taiwanese people have not had a secure livelihood. These conditions produced the incident in Taipei. . . . Second, as for political reforms, we can have the Resolution Committee study the matter and propose some concrete measures to reform Taiwan's political system. Third, the governor-general (you) still was surrounded by subordinates, and because of the seriousness of the current crisis, we hope you can break through this ring of advisors and have a better understanding of the people's conditions and conduct discussions with openness and sincerity so that our problems can be solved.⁴⁷

Governor-General Ch'en I replied:


My economic and political policies are correct, but I realize that my subordinates do not always clearly understand them. Unemployment is severe, and the government will try to remedy this. Any good suggestions about political reform, no matter whether from the Resolution Committee or from the general public, I will accept as well. Political matters divide into two jurisdictions: those of national administration and those of local administration. I hope your opinions, as submitted, will be related to local administrative matters.⁴⁸

On Tuesday, conditions in Taipei remained relatively calm. Shops remained open and trains operated, although Mainlanders were still being beaten in the streets. The few Mainlanders who ventured outdoors usually did so only to flee the city.

At 10:00 A.M. on Wednesday, March 5, the Alliance of Youth for the Self-Government of Taiwan was founded at Chung-shan Auditorium. It




Taiwan's Governor-General: Admiral Hasegawa Kiyoshi. Source: *Nanpō no kyoten. Taiwan: shashin hōdō* (Tokyo, 1944).



Taiwanese Military Cadets Marching in Taipei's Main Street. Source: *Nanpō no kyoten. Taiwan: shashin hōdō* (Tokyo, 1944).

大東亞戰台與灣

一九四三年九月三日，臺灣青年團在臺南舉行團訓，全體團員參加，場面熱烈。此為當時的宣傳照片。



“A Mass Meeting of Young Taiwanese on September 23, 1944, Expressing Their Gratitude for Military Conscription to Commence January 1, 1945.” Source: *Nanpō no kyoten*. *Taiwan: shashin hōdō* (Tokyo, 1944).



“The 10th Training Class of Girl Students in Close Order Marching on the Training Course.” Source: *Nanpō no kyoten*. *Taiwan: shashin hōdō* (Tokyo, 1944).

“A Brave and Loyal Young Taiwanese Who Represents the Passion and Spirit of the Imperial Army.” Source: *Nanpō no kyoten*. *Taiwan: shashin hōdō* (Tokyo, 1944).





Ch'en I, Governor-General of the Taiwan Provincial Administrative Executive Office during the Uprising.



Left: Ch'iu Nien-t'ai, Member, Control Yüan; Center: Pao K'o-yung, Head, Dept. of Industry & Mining (ca. March 1947); Right: Jen Hsien-ch'ün, Head, Dept. of Transportation. Source: *T'ai-wan shih-jih-chih*, vol. 1 (Taipei, 1947).



Li I-chung, Chairman, Executive Committee of the Kuomintang Taiwan Party Headquarters. Source: *T'ai-wan shih-jih-chih*, vol. 1.



Chou I-o, Head, Dept. of Civil Affairs. Source: *T'ai-wan shih-jih-chih*, vol. 1.



Lin Mao-sheng, Dean, College of Liberal Arts, National Taiwan University; Publisher, *Min-pao*. Source: *T'ai-wan chan-hou ch'u-ch'i ti min-i tai-piao* (Taipei, 1986).



Chiang Wei-ch'uan, Chairman, Political Construction Association.



Hsieh Tung-min, District Chief, Kaohsiung District (1945-46).



Lin Jih-cao, Councilman, Taiwan Provincial Council. Source: *T'ai-wan chan-hou ch'u-ch'i ti min-i tai-piao*.



Huang Ch'ao-ch'in, Speaker, Taiwan Provincial Council.



Lin Hsien-t'ang, Councilman, National Council.



Wang Min-ning, Head, Dept. of Police.



Yang Chao-chia, Member, Taiwan Provincial Government Committee (ca. 1950).



Yeh Ming-hsün, Director, China Central News Agency in Taipei. Source: *T'ai-wan shih-jih-chih*, vol. 1.



Hsieh O, Physician; Member, National Assembly. Source: *T'ai-wan shih-jih-chih*, vol. 1.



Hsieh Tung-min, Deputy Head, Dept. of Civil Affairs (ca. March 1947). Source: *T'ai-wan shih-jih-chih*, vol. 1.

proposed six resolutions which demonstrate the desire for drastic reform and immediate democratization:⁴⁹

1. Establish a new high-level system of self-rule that can make Taiwan a model province for a new China.
2. Speedily carry out elections for choosing heads of the province, districts, and cities to build new political foundations.
3. Invigorate the spirit of our Taiwanese brethren to uphold the law in order to become the *avant garde* for a democratic political order.
4. Create new cultural achievements in our country for the people and for humanity throughout the world.
5. Expand production, create new industry, stabilize the economy, and enrich the people's livelihood.
6. Purify the people's spirit, promote righteousness, and improve society.

At 2:00 P.M. Wednesday, the Resolution Committee met at Chung-shan Auditorium and split into discussion groups. At 4:40 P.M., members reconvened to hear final reports, among which was that of the Righteous Service Corps:

We recommend that expenses for the Resolution Committee be covered by funds raised from large companies, banks, and public associations that represent the well-to-do and business, and that Ch'en I-sung, Wang T'ien-teng, Wu Ch'un-sheng, and Huang Ch'ao-sheng explain to the central government the truth of this Incident and discuss how to control prices and solve the grain problem.⁵⁰

Li Tsung-hsien, a member of the Resolution Committee, stood up and declared that the Electric Power Company should be managed by the Taiwanese. Wang T'ien-teng rose and said that all organs in Taichung city were under Taiwanese control. Moderates like Li Wan-chü also spoke, saying that the purpose of the Uprising was to demand political reforms—not ask for authority to control all matters. Yet he also urged that the Resolution Committee immediately establish branches in all counties.

Despite its heated discussion, Governor-General Ch'en I conveyed to the Resolution Committee his willingness to mix with the members and even shake hands with them, and "he hoped that the people would present to him their opinions regarding political reforms."⁵¹ However, even as the Resolution Committee was convening that day, signs printed in Japanese began to appear on many streets requesting that all former servicemen in the Japanese military meet at designated places. When Mainlanders tried to approach to read these signs, people kept them at a distance.⁵² Nevertheless, normality was being restored to Taipei, and the beatings of Mainlanders steadily declined.

On Thursday, March 6, the Resolution Committee published its resolutions (*Kao ch'üan-kuo t'ung-pao-shu*) and stated that it wanted to "get rid of corrupt officials, try to reform the provincial government, and would not exclude the Mainlanders who were our brethren." The implication was that Mainlanders, who in fact ran the ROC, would have no role in Taiwan except at the pleasure of the Taiwanese. Some committee members argued that Mainlanders deserved fair treatment, saying, "On February 28, some Mainlanders were beaten, but these incidents were caused by misunderstanding, and we are very sad they happened. . . . Henceforth, such an occurrence will not happen again, and from now on our slogans will be directed to improving Taiwan's political conditions."⁵³

Sometime that same day, Thursday, March 6, members of the Taiwan Provincial Council telegraphed President Chiang Kai-shek and other high-ranking officials to give their views of the reasons for the disturbances and suggest steps the central government should take. This long telegram described the origins of the crisis as follows:

Because the Monopoly Bureau investigated an alleged case of smuggling by a retailer, a person was killed, and this incident enraged the people. Riots of serious magnitude have broken out, and many people have been killed and wounded. These disturbances have occurred because of a widening gap between the provincial government and the people. Officials were corrupt, the administrative system has been in chaos, and some officials and police have not obeyed the law, even refusing to use Taiwanese of great talent in the administration. There also was a different wage scale for Taiwanese and Mainlanders. Of the Japanese property that had been built up through the sweat and tears of the Taiwanese people, more than half was confiscated by the officials and police. These are the main reasons why the disturbances became so violent. The incident has worsened, and to remedy the situation, we urgently recommend that you consider these proposals: First, please use more able Taiwanese for the position of the general-secretary of the provincial administration and for department heads in the provincial government. Second, place Taiwanese in charge of all schools in the educational system, and allow them to serve as judges for the local and high courts. Third, abolish the Monopoly Bureau by changing it into a publicly owned enterprise. Fourth, change the Trade Bureau into a business-managed organ and run it on a nonprofit basis. Fifth, take the people's interest into account when handling the disposal of all seized Japanese property. Sixth, as Sun Yat-sen recommended in his *Outline for National Reconstruction*, hold popular elections for local government. Seventh, guarantee free speech, a free press, and freedom of assembly. Eighth, guarantee people's security and the protection of their property. Ninth, please dispatch immediately your highest-ranking official to come to Taiwan to help resolve this incident. Avoid using military power to suppress this incident or else it will become even more serious.⁵⁴

Another organ, the Taiwan Provincial Construction Committee (*Taiwan-sheng chien-she-hui*) also stepped forward, advancing its recommendations to the Resolution Committee. One of these was that the Taiwan Provincial Council create a large assembly with different representatives.⁵⁵ Another was that a group called the Provincial Reform Commission (*Sheng-cheng kai-ko wei-yüan-hui*) determine whether the Monopoly Bureau, the Trade Bureau, and other publicly owned enterprises should be abolished or allowed to exist, and consider whether the provincial government's Propaganda Commission, the Labor Training Camp, and other organs should be abolished or integrated.⁵⁶

That same Thursday afternoon, March 6, the Taiwan Provincial Councilman Wang T'ien-teng made a broadcast to the people declaring that "the February 28 Incident that led to the beatings of so many Mainlanders was a gross misunderstanding. Henceforth, I hope that Taiwanese and Mainlanders can cooperate to reform the Taiwan political system."⁵⁷

At 8:30 P.M. Thursday, Governor-General Ch'en I made his third radio broadcast, expressing his desire to reform the political system and requesting that everyone try to restore harmony and solve the food grain problem.⁵⁸ He then made these promises, which met at least some of the demands for democratization:

First, as for the organs of administration, I am considering changing the Executive Office to a normal provincial government administration; I will ask the central government to approve that request. If the central government approves, we can immediately make this reorganization. As for the officials of the Taiwan provincial government and the various department heads and their staff, I will try to employ more Taiwanese. I hope that the Taiwan Provincial Council and other legally empowered groups that represent the people can recommend people with integrity, pure thought, and talent as candidates. I will recommend these people to be approved by the central government. As for the officials of district and city administrative organs, I have already drawn up the procedures. I will order that elections be held on July 1 of this year. Before June 30, we should have an election law. I will ask the central government to approve the July 1 election for district and city officials. Before these popular elections are held, if the people believe that the present district and city officials are unqualified, I will have them dismissed. In order to fill those vacancies, if the city councils or legal groups want to participate, they can consult with the people to select qualified people to fill them. In short, I hope that through such popular representation three candidates can be nominated. I will select one of those three to be the district or city head, and they will then become responsible for setting up the popular elections. However, if the people believe that those officials currently in office can fulfill their responsibility, they can continue to carry on their duties. As for reforming all levels of the administration, after these have been reorganized, the provincial government will decide the

outcome. After appointments at the district and city levels have been made, those officials will then manage their offices.⁵⁹

By this time, however, the prospects for conciliation had reached a low point because of escalating violence and the shrill demands from the Taipei Resolution Committee. On Thursday (March 6), the Control Yüan sent a cable to Yang Liang-kung, the censor of Fukien and Taiwan, asking him to go to the island and deal with the crisis.⁶⁰ Considerable fighting had occurred in Keelung, the port of his arrival. At the same time, General P'eng Meng-chi, Commander of the Kaohsiung Fortress Headquarters, suppressed violent disturbances there.⁶¹

The next day, Friday, March 7, the Taipei Resolution Committee drew up a number of new demands to be presented to the Governor-General's Executive Office and the central government.⁶² These became known as the "32 Demands," although in fact more were subsequently added. The first group of demands focused on handling the current crisis, and one requested that Nationalist military forces disarm and turn their weapons over to the Resolution Committees. A second group of demands related to fundamental reforms involving the military and the political system. In brief, these demands called for expanded elections based on a new law allowing for self-government—a law that would allow Taiwanese to virtually run the provincial government. Around 3:30 P.M., the Resolution Committee formulated ten more demands for reform, which merely refined other requests (for the text of all these demands, see Appendix A).

On Saturday, March 8, the Resolution Committee tried to retreat from the aggressive 32 Demands drawn up on Friday after listening to a report by Chang Mu-t'ao, the commander of the Fourth Regiment of military police. Chang told them:

You demand self-rule, and that is entirely correct. Do not let the mean and ambitious bad elements take advantage of the situation and gain political power. I urge you not to interfere in military affairs. The military police now stationed in Taiwan and the troops guarding the garrisons and airfields are only a handful, but they are still part of the national military forces of the central government. According to reports, the requests made by your committee request that, except for the military police, the military troops should disarm. I profoundly hope that you will not make those kinds of demands and that you will not involve the military in the whirlpool of politics. If you disarm the military, that can only be regarded as offending the central government. In the present circumstances, all armed military units have already accepted the people's demands, and they are not authorized to leave their military camps. Wherever any conflict takes place, it is because of attempts to disarm the military. If the masses do not try to disarm the troops, how can there be any cause for conflict? Any demands by the people in Taiwan for

reforming the polity are perfectly appropriate. The central government definitely will not send troops to Taiwan. . . . Everyone wants each of you to have trust in the central government. Your demands for reforming the polity must be able to elicit a broad sympathy. Therefore, we hope that our Taiwan brethren will not offend the central government. We also hope that everyone will cooperate with all their power to preserve harmony. I will swear with my life that the central government definitely will not send troops to Taiwan.⁶³

After listening to Chang, many committee members realized they had gone too far in their demands. Later that afternoon, the Resolution Committee published the following statement:

On March 7, this committee decided to ask Governor-General Ch'en I to accept and carry out 32 demands, because at that time the groups participating in drawing up this request were exceptionally numerous. There was no way to give the 32 demands any further review. Therefore, some of those demands—for example, dismantling the police department, disarming the military troops, etc.—were almost traitorous. These definitely did not reflect the public's opinion.⁶⁴

The committee then expressed its new objectives: "Because corrupt officials have now been removed by the struggle for reforming Taiwan's political system, our motto is the reform of Taiwan's democratic political system."⁶⁵ Despite the committee's abrupt switch to greater conciliation, it came too late to resolve the crisis. At 6:00 A.M. on Sunday, March 9, the Garrison Command again imposed martial law, and provincial authorities reverted to the position of demanding that the violence cease, that the rebels lay down their arms, and that all public buildings, and so on, be returned to the provincial administration.

In the early hours of March 9, soon after midnight, advance units of Nationalist troops began landing in Keelung, because the Uprising had rapidly spread from Taipei to other cities. The revolt had already gained momentum because of the 100,000 radio sets on the island. As noted in the Yang Liang-kung report of April 1947, radicals seizing radio stations could effectively call for violent or revolutionary action. We must also remember that from the standpoint of the government, events in Taipei were not compartmentalized. Even if Taipei citizens became increasingly conciliatory, the government formed policy in response to events throughout the island.

Keelung

In Keelung city on the evening of February 28, harbor stevedores attacked a branch police station and began beating Mainlanders. Crowds

assembled at the Kao-sa and Chung-yang theaters, and began beating Mainlanders after the films were over.⁶⁶ On March 1, Keelung Harbor's security force commander, Shih Hung-hsi, proclaimed a city curfew. In the afternoon, the vice-speaker of the Keelung City Council, Yang Yüan-ting, called an emergency meeting attended by many citizens who rose to denounce Governor-General Ch'en I.⁶⁷

On March 3, stevedores attacked the No. 14 Pier, but they failed to occupy it and suffered many casualties.⁶⁸ On the same day, three central government navy destroyers, originally ordered to Japan for Nanking's symbolic occupation of Japan, were diverted and arrived in Keelung. This was the first sign of military reinforcements, and the ships aroused fear throughout the city. On March 6, when a rumor spread that Nationalist troops would soon arrive, fear again swept the city. On March 7 at 3:00 P.M., students held a meeting in which they and local council members called for reforms to eliminate corruption among city officials. They also appealed to all citizens to remain calm.⁶⁹ That evening, crowds clashed with Keelung military units, but there were no serious casualties.

On March 8 at 2:00 P.M., the Keelung Resolution Committee met with the Keelung Harbor security force commander, Shih Hung-hsi, to discuss how to end the disturbances. They agreed to appeal to the people to protect all soldiers and "good" Mainlanders.⁷⁰ On March 9 in the evening, Yang Liang-kung, the censor for Fukien and Taiwan, arrived by ship from Fukien, accompanied by some Nationalist troops, the first reinforcements to arrive. That evening and the next day, March 9, ships unloaded troops in Keelung who brutally restored order and reinstated Nationalist control.

Pan-ch'iao and Neighboring Towns

In Pan-ch'iao of Taiwan county, people gathered at the railway station on the morning of February 28 and began beating Mainlanders or rounding them up and assembling them in one place. A riot also broke out at the Ying-ko railway station just outside Taipei city when a truck with soldiers arrived, shooting broke out, a lieutenant was killed, and two soldiers were wounded. In Shih-lin and Hsin-tien towns, crowds attacked a supply bureau and a food warehouse. In Jui-fang, Chin-kua-shih, and Tamsui, people burned the dormitories where Mainlanders lived. In San-ch'ung, however, not until March 6 did crowds burn the police station.⁷¹

After violence broke out in Pan-ch'iao, town officials immediately fled, and crowds attacked the supply bureau, removed all materials, and set fire to the building. The Taiwan provincial councilmen Lin Jih-kao and Lin Tsung-hsien led the crowds in attacking the government. Lin Tsung-hsien

ordered his local newspaper, *Chung-wai jih-pao*, to denounce Ch'en I's policies. On March 7, the people of Pan-ch'iao established a branch committee of the Taipei District's Resolution Committee, modeled after the Taipei committee. But on March 9, central government troops arrived, the committee dissolved, and many people fled.⁷²

On March 2, in the city of I-lan in northeast Taiwan, people began beating Mainlanders.⁷³ Crowds poured into the streets on March 3 to show support for the Taipei demonstrators. Young people and students formed squads, and after finding weapons, attacked an air force warehouse, as well as some military camps and weapons depots in Lo-tung and Su-ao. They rounded up Mainlanders, assembled them in one area, and then formed a large military unit to attack an encampment of provincial government troops.⁷⁴ On March 13, however, government troops entered I-lan, and the streets of the city were soon filled with Nationalist flags.⁷⁵ The leaders of the revolt escaped to Su-ao and fled by sea.⁷⁶

T'ao-yüan and Neighboring Areas

The district head, Chu Wen-po, had left T'ao-yüan (Hsin-chu district) on February 28, to go to Taipei. After going to the Land Bank about loans for irrigating farmland and the repair of schools in Hsin-chu, he drove to T'ai-p'ing Street. Crowds blocked his vehicle, demanding to know whether he was a Mainlander, and then pulled him out and began to beat him. Somehow Chu escaped, and was harmed no further after a Taiwanese concealed him.⁷⁷

That very same evening, in T'ao-yüan, crowds began beating Mainlanders. By 8:00 P.M., many young people began forming groups to criticize officials and to denounce the government as corrupt. Around seven or eight hundred young people also held a meeting to criticize the government and to call on the people to beat Mainlanders.⁷⁸

On March 1, around thirty young people from Taipei came to T'ao-yüan, assembled at the T'ao-yüan railway station, and organized a squad "to seize the railway police weapons and control all the trains that tried to pass through."⁷⁹ They also began beating Mainlanders, while crying slogans such as "Elevate the Power of the Taiwanese for Self-Rule!" "Stamp Out Corruption!" and "Down With an Inefficient Government!" Some of these activists cut off the head of a pig, placed it on the table of the city's largest temple, and held a ceremony, declaring that "by putting a military cap on top of a pig's head, the pig's head represents the soldiers and corrupt officials of the government."⁸⁰ The activists then searched for the property of officials like Chu Wen-po and the head of the Civil Af-

fairs Division. Public officials fled to the police station for safety,⁸¹ and those who did not reach it were caught by crowds and put in the city's largest temple. The crowds then proceeded to attack the district government office.

Meanwhile, the district government officials had invited some members of the Taiwan Provincial Council, high school principals, the city mayor, and other local officials to discuss policy. Knowing of this meeting, the activists went to the district government office and attacked Mainlanders. All government officials fled, leaving the district government office defenseless, and ready to be taken over, "without shedding blood."⁸² Crowds at the police bureau demanded that the police hand over their weapons, and a struggle broke out. Other elements of the crowd then attacked the district government and air force warehouses. Throughout the city, firing could be heard late into the night.

Early on March 2, heavy rain pounded the city. At the police bureau, those inside prepared to resist attack. Because the rain was so heavy, some policemen were able to use it for cover and leave by the back door and flee to Taipei for help.⁸³ A group of activists who had captured some local officials took them to the temple, forced them to kneel before it, and then allowed local people to come and observe them. These activists then established their paramilitary branches with a headquarters for the purpose of countering the Provincial Defense Commander's Headquarters.⁸⁴

By March 3, the riots in T'ao-yüan city had spread to neighboring towns and villages, and even to the sea coast. Some activists went aboard ships that entered the harbor, searched for Mainlanders, and beat them.⁸⁵ Crowds in Hsin-chu city began burning the city hall, the courthouse, the information office, the Monopoly Bureau's branch office, and dormitories where Mainlanders lived.⁸⁶ Local activists and those who had entered the city from other areas began to organize the people into teams that beat Mainlanders who had opened their shops, seized the weapons of officials, and attacked the local sugar factory. That afternoon, military police tried to restore order, and the rioting gradually ceased. In the evening, some people organized a Resolution Committee like that in Taipei. On March 4, the Garrison Command sent troops under General Su Shao-wen to the Hsin-chu district, and the troops quickly restored order.

Taichung

The Uprising spread to Taichung city in the afternoon of February 28 about the same time that riots were erupting in Taipei and Keelung. At 9:00 A.M. on March 1, the Taichung City Council contacted the Taichung

District Council and the Chang-hua City Council to meet and discuss the disturbances in Taipei.⁸⁷ At the meeting, some people who wanted to reform the Executive Office and change procedures for appointing district and city heads threatened to order business establishments, offices, and schools to close if their demands were not met. The group also dispatched National Assemblyman Lin Lien-tung to Taipei to express the desires of the Taichung people.

Rioting spread from Taichung to nearby areas. Around 3:00 P.M., people in Chang-hua city began to beat Mainlanders at the train station and burned furniture and equipment they had removed from the dormitories of city officials and police.

In Taichung that evening, word spread that there would be a large meeting the next day.⁸⁸ At 7:00 A.M. on March 2, a large number of people in Taichung city gathered at the city's central theater to listen to a journalist from the *Ho-p'ing jih-pao* (*Peace Daily*) describe the Taipei disturbances and denounce Ch'en I's administration. Many agreed to follow the example of the Taipei Uprising.⁸⁹ The people then selected as their chairwoman Hsieh Hsüeh-hung, a Communist. Hsieh strongly urged that a party be organized to take political power and establish democratic self-rule.⁹⁰

Around 11:00 A.M. on March 2, crowds began beating Mainlanders and overturning vehicles. People surrounded the police bureau and demanded that the police chief, Hung Tzu-min, hand over the weapons of the military police so that they could be unloaded and kept out of the hands of the military. Other crowds gathered at the city hall, at the city's KMT Party headquarters, at the Third Aircraft Factory, at the Sixth Services Factory, and at the Military Supply Station. In response to the large meeting the evening before, groups of young men organized squads under the leadership of Wu Chen-wu, a former lieutenant in the Japanese navy. These squads were called the Self-Administration Forces, and they quickly occupied the city radio station. Later in the afternoon, the squads encircled the Taichung branch office of the Monopoly Bureau and presented the bureau with three demands: "First, abolish the monopoly organization; second, give up all weapons in the Bureau; third, hand over all materials to the people for their management."⁹¹

After rounding up government officials, the activists went in search of Chao Ch'eng, the head of the Monopoly Bureau, who had escaped to the house of the Taichung District Chief, Liu Ts'un-hou. Ordinary people liked and respected Liu and would not attack his house. When Liu came out of the house to talk, however, some persons in the crowd started to beat him. A policeman from the Taichung police station, Liu Ch'ing-shan,

discharged his revolver into the air, and those beating Liu withdrew. Then one of the activists in the crowd hurled a grenade into Liu's home, an explosion occurred, and a fire started. A fire engine called to the scene sprayed gasoline rather than water on the dwelling, causing the blaze to increase.⁹²

Officials hiding in Liu's home came running out, only to encounter Hsieh Hsüeh-hung, who had just arrived. Hsieh promised that no weapons would be used, that all officials would be protected, and that they would be taken to the police bureau. When the officials arrived at the bureau, however, they found that the police chief, Hung Tzu-min, had already surrendered to Hsieh. The activists made Hung and the other officials stand in the order of their rank, beginning with District Chief Liu, followed by Chao, the Monopoly Bureau head, policeman Liu Ch'ing-shan, and other officials. Hsieh forced them to kneel before the crowd and apologize to the people and then ordered them beaten. Liu Ch'ing-shan was so severely injured that he fainted and had to be taken to the Taichung Hospital, where a crowd entered the building and beat him to death.⁹³ The activists then ordered that all Mainlanders in the city be confined in the city's main hotels, the city office, the jail, and the No. 8 warehouse.⁹⁴

On the evening of March 2, activists from Chang-hua and a group of aborigines from P'u-li attacked a nearby military camp and then organized a Resolution Committee with sub-committees for security, administrative affairs, general affairs, information, and an executive branch.⁹⁵ They then broke open the government food grain warehouse and distributed rice to the people.

The Resolution Committee then proposed that all associations under its umbrella be organized to attack the Nationalist provincial administration. On March 3, Hsieh set up and took charge of the Taichung Area Security Committee Headquarters, from which she used forces to attack the military units located in Taichung city's downtown district and in front of the city's parks. Later, she publicly announced that she had arrested thirty lower-rank officers, 300 soldiers, and an unknown number of public service officials.⁹⁶ On that evening, crowds attacked a firearms warehouse, and gunfire reverberated through the night.⁹⁷ The activists were now in total control of Taichung city and the suburbs.⁹⁸ Hsieh Hsüeh-hung issued this statement:

We are 6.5 million Taiwanese, and we must strive for real self-rule, eliminate corruption, and reform the political system. Now, all of the people of our province can become armed to fight and destroy this tyrannical government. We want to eternally struggle to achieve this righteous goal. We hope the people will join our struggle.⁹⁹

Then she proposed three principles: Do not kill or wound Mainlanders; do not burn and destroy public property; work to have all weapons placed in the hands of the people.

Hsieh then took 28 rifles and some 100 knives from the police bureau, armed young people, and sent them to guard the transport routes. Meanwhile, she ordered the takeover of the Taichung Radio Station to control news and information.

On the morning of March 4, the Third Aircraft Factory surrendered to Hsieh's forces. At 4:00 P.M., some 500 delegates from various popular organizations met at the city auditorium and decided to set up a Taichung District Resolution Committee. The crowd agreed that Chuang Ch'ui-sheng would be chairman and passed a statement that "with military power, we must strive for self-rule by the people."¹⁰⁰ They then set up organs for handling general affairs, security, information, and coordination.

At this point, some delegates began to oppose Hsieh's leadership because of her Communist connections. They argued that the people would not support their committee if they knew she was the leader. One of the most powerful and well-respected local leaders, Lin Hsien-t'ang, also opposed Hsieh and disagreed with the use of weapons. Thus the Resolution Committee decided not to arm the people. Although the Resolution Committee's leaders had become divided on tactics, they remained unified in their opposition to the Kuomintang by shouting such slogans as "Down With the KMT!," "Down With One-Party Rule of a Tyrannical Government!," "Set Up Self-Government by the People!," and "Organize a Democratic Army!"¹⁰¹

On March 7, some of the young Taichung activists set up a unit called the Twenty-seventh Militia Corps (*Erh-ch'i pu-tui*) and put it under the control of a para-military unit called the No. 8 Brigade.¹⁰² The Corps became an armed unit that repaired weapons and vehicles in preparation for an eventual battle with government troops. However, when the Corps wanted to attack a nearby military encampment, local leaders, fearing bloodshed and an irrevocable split between Taiwan and the Mainland, demanded a peaceful solution. Then on March 8, people learned that Nationalist troops were approaching Taichung. As fear spread through the city, many committees began disbanding and burning all documents.

On March 11 at 8:00 P.M., all sub-committee members and major committee members, such as Chuang Ch'ui-sheng, Huang Ch'ao-ch'in, Chang Huan-k'uei, Yeh Jung-chung, Huang Tung, Wu Yung-ch'ang, and others, held an emergency meeting to discuss whether the Resolution Committee should be continued.¹⁰³ They agreed to ask the city mayor, Huang

K'o-li, to return to his job. Although Hsieh opposed this and the resolution failed to pass, the committee's top leadership decided to disband, and in the Taichung region all opposition toward the government ended. Meanwhile, members of the Twenty-seventh Militia Corps reviewed the situation and devised an escape plan to the mountains. On March 12, they assembled weapons and food, and went to establish a base in the P'u-li city elementary school to fight the Nationalist troops.

On March 13 at 3:00 P.M., government troops of the Twenty-first Division entered Taichung and set up their headquarters.¹⁰⁴ The next day they dispatched 800 soldiers from the 436th Regiment of the 146th Brigade to Ts'ao-tun. In a broadcast, they informed the Twenty-seventh Militia Corps that if it surrendered, its members would not be prosecuted.

More Nationalist troops of battalion size then moved to Erh-shui, passing through Chi-chi to Shui-li-keng, where two companies independently fanned out to secure the Sun Moon Lake (Jih-yüeh-t'an) and Men-p'ei Lake areas, the site of two hydroelectric stations. After arriving in Yü-ch'ih, Nationalist troops were able to surround P'u-li. The Twenty-seventh Militia Corps still was in high fighting spirits, but its leaders, finding themselves surrounded, outnumbered, and short of supplies, decided on March 16 not to fight. At 11:00 P.M., the Corps buried their weapons and fled. On March 17, government troops entered P'u-li, and the Taichung uprising ended.

Chia-i

The uprising in Chia-i city began on March 2, influenced mainly by the events in Taichung. On that morning, many Taiwanese beat Mainlanders on the train traveling from Taichung to Kaohsiung. In the second-class compartments, Mainlanders were reportedly forced to undress down to their underwear, and when the train arrived at Chia-i, they were taken off it and beaten. A placard was then placed on the train windows stating, "We prohibit Mainlanders from boarding this train."¹⁰⁵ In the streets, anybody wearing the Chinese robe (*ch'i-p'ao*) whether Taiwanese or Mainlander, was beaten. Rioting quickly spread from the train station to the heart of Chia-i city. Shops closed, schools emptied, and the police fled, leaving many of their weapons.¹⁰⁶

That same evening, activists attacked a military food grain warehouse and occupied the city government and police bureau offices. The city mayor fled to a nearby military police station for protection. Activists seized the city hall and set up their Fighting Headquarters. Government officials and troops of the Twenty-first Division's First Battalion, mean-

while, had fled to the Chia-i airport, which was then surrounded by activists from the city. Fighting broke out and some 50 to 60 people were reportedly killed. Some officials and their families who had not been able to flee were captured and imprisoned in the city's Chung-shan Auditorium, at the KMT party headquarters, and in city hall. The Chia-i riots spread to other towns, and the activists soon organized fighting units made up of a variety of people, including underworld elements and aborigines.¹⁰⁷

On March 9, the activists made four requests, threatening an attack on the airport if the Chia-i city mayor did not respond:¹⁰⁸

1. ROC military units should surrender.
2. The airport radio system should be handed over to the Resolution Committee.
3. All police weapons should be surrendered.
4. Military police weapons should be given to the Resolution Committee. Military police also could enter the city to keep order if they were unarmed.

On the next day, Governor-General Ch'en I telegraphed the mayor of Chia-i, stating, "Fight to the end; troops will arrive soon."¹⁰⁹ On March 11, Governor-General Ch'en I again telegraphed that "army troops will be airlifted soon,"¹¹⁰ and, in fact, at 2:00 P.M., central government troops arrived by air at Chia-i airport. On the morning of March 12, all officials who had been arrested were released by the activists, and well-known anti-government activists fled to the mountains or to the sea. In the afternoon, troops entered the city, and the uprising ended.¹¹¹

Tainan

By March 2, when some 60 activists from Taipei arrived in Tainan city, radicals had already set up the Southern Alliance Association to oppose the government. Taiwanese policemen in the Tainan city police force had given up their weapons and abandoned their duties, enabling activists to arm themselves. City officials and security authorities held an emergency meeting to deal with the crisis.

On March 3, beatings of Mainlanders began and spread everywhere. The activists took over all official organs and the radio station.¹¹² The afternoon saw the appearance of banners with such slogans as "Get Rid of KMT Rule!," "We Demand Self-Government!," and "Make Taiwan Independent!"¹¹³ At a large meeting, the following eight resolutions were endorsed:¹¹⁴

1. All students will form the No. 1 Fighting Team.
2. The Southern Alliance Association will become the No. 3 Fighting Team.
3. The city, section and neighborhood associations, and other small groups will be reorganized.
4. A unified armed forces command center for the navy, army, and air force will be set up.
5. Totally support the February 28 Uprising until the Nationalist Government's unconditional surrender.
6. All arms will be used to fight against central government troops until the end.
7. Popular elections will be held for selecting the Tainan district chief officials.
8. If there are Taiwanese hiding Mainlanders, take them to the student-military units immediately, and search each of their households.

On March 4, people stayed in their homes and all shops remained closed, and only students and other groups who opposed the central government were seen in the streets. However, on March 11, Nationalist troops arrived in Tainan, imposed martial law, and executed leaders. The uprising had ended.

Kaohsiung and Neighboring Areas

The uprising in Kaohsiung city erupted on the evening of March 3 and continued into the morning of March 4. Radicals beat Mainlanders, and government officials from the Railway Office, the Port Authority, courts, the Police Bureau, the municipal government, and the Civil Air office, as well as the military police, fled to the Kaohsiung Fortress Headquarters located in the mountains near Hsi-tzu-wan.¹¹⁵

Activists occupied city hall, and at first they discussed how to set fire to the Kaohsiung Fortress Headquarters. Then the leaders decided to negotiate with the commander, General P'eng Meng-chi. Around 10:00 A.M. on March 6, a team of delegates set forth, made up of Kaohsiung city mayor Huang Chung-t'u, the city council's head, P'eng Ch'ing-k'ao, and three activists named T'u Kuang-ming, Tseng Feng-ming, and Lin Chieh. Upon entering the Fortress Headquarters, they requested that the commander disarm. General P'eng Meng-chi was infuriated by this request, and he ordered the delegates seized, had the three activists executed, incarcerated P'eng Ch'ing-k'ao, and released Huang to return to Kaohsiung.¹¹⁶ Before Huang had returned to report what had occurred to the Kaohsiung Reso-

lution Committee, P'eng Meng-chi dispatched 300 soldiers to descend the mountain, quickly enter the city, and immediately attack the city hall. As shooting commenced, a number of city representatives including Wang P'ing-shui were killed. Upon learning of this attack and the killing, armed activists quickly assembled and attacked these troops. Fighting continued deep into the night with heavy losses on both sides. By March 7, the uprising had ended in Kaohsiung, and P'eng's forces were in control of the city.

In the southern district of P'ing-tung, the uprising broke out on March 4. The pattern was similar to that already described in other cities. First, crowds seized the city council and other organs and immediately created a Resolution Committee. That afternoon, students and crowds collected all weapons from the police bureau. On March 9, Nationalist troops arrived, and on March 10, the uprising ended.¹¹⁷ No casualties were reported in P'ing-tung city.

Hua-lien

On March 2, in Hua-lien city on the east coast, the district chief, Chang Wen-ch'eng, notified all organ heads and local leaders to meet at 2:00 P.M. to discuss how to prevent an uprising. They decided to "try to stabilize food grain prices and protect living standards."¹¹⁸

On March 4, a member of the Young People's Association named Ma Yu-yüeh rallied the youth of Hua-lien by telling them why the Taipei uprising had occurred. At 3:00 P.M., he called a big meeting and requested that police not intervene. Over 3,000 persons attended and agreed to set up a local Resolution Committee. Ma then proposed six demands, as well as twelve resolutions.¹¹⁹ His demands were the following: Only the Taiwanese should rule the island; the central government should send grain to Taiwan to feed the hungry; corrupt officials should be returned to China; the military and police should disarm; the Maritime Customs should be abolished; and passenger bus charges for the Suao-Hualien Highway should be reduced.

The twelve resolutions were as follows:¹²⁰

1. All grain from the Food Grain Bureau should be allocated to the heads of neighborhood associations for direct distribution to the people; if the grain proved to be insufficient, then sweet potatoes and other substitutes should be distributed in the same way.
2. Goods imported from other districts should not be taxed.
3. Reduce the charges on passengers as levied by the Highway Bureau.

4. Disarm the military and civil police.
5. If security cannot be maintained by military police and ordinary police, members of the Young People's Association will assume that responsibility.
6. Military and civil police should not use their weapons to frighten the ordinary people.
7. Enforce the Constitution and immediately elect a provincial governor and district officials.
8. All neighborhood association heads will meet that evening at the home of Ma Yu-yüeh to discuss the uprising, evaluate it, and report to Taipei.
9. The Young People's Association should obey the orders of the Resolution Committee.
10. Even though this uprising depended upon the weapons of our Taiwanese policemen, we must recruit Taiwanese police to become the backbone of our uprising against the central government.
11. All corrupt officials and Mainlanders should be assembled at a central place.
12. The authorities should respond to these resolutions by tomorrow morning.

The evening before, the Hua-lien district chief had ordered that all weapons be sent to a nearby military encampment, but this order was blocked by some Taiwanese members of the local police force, who may have been responsible for the later disappearance of some weapons from the Police Bureau.

On March 5, a large crowd gathered in Chung-shan Auditorium at the city's center and agreed to establish a branch office of the Resolution Committee. They endorsed twelve recommendations:¹²¹

1. Security will be maintained by organizations of the Young People's Association, the students, the army, navy, air force, fire fighters, and police.
2. All military and local police will be forbidden to leave their stations; they will not be allowed to carry weapons; and their daily food will be provided by the Resolution Committee.
3. All surplus rice of the Food Grain Bureau and the Monopoly Bureau will be requisitioned by the Resolution Committee.
4. All organs of transport, post offices, and power plants will continue to function as usual.
5. The Chinese people on both sides of the straits should be reconciled.
6. All corrupt officials will be identified.

7. No bloodshed should take place to resolve the current crisis.
8. Three delegates will be sent to supervise the district officer.
9. The *Tung T'ai Daily News* will change its reporting and respond to the people's will.
10. All publicly owned enterprises will be transferred to the people.
11. Maritime customs will be abolished.
12. All drugs and medicines under the control of the Committee Responsible for Japanese Property will be dispensed to the poor and sick, and the present head of the Food Grain Bureau will be replaced.

Meanwhile, the Resolution Committee picked Ma Yu-yüeh as its chairman; Liu Fu-shun and 23 others would form the Food Grain Committee; Hsü Hsi-ch'ien and four others would set up the Security Committee; Cheng Tung-hsin and two others would make up the Administrative Council; Cheng Tung-mao and eleven others would serve as the Fund Raising Committee; and Ch'en Wen-chih and four others would serve on the Information Committee. If more committee members were required, aborigines could be invited to participate.

Tensions rose in Hua-lien city as more crowds massed at this seemingly endless round of meetings. Because there were only about thirty military police in the city, the district chief, Chang Wen-cheng, urged all Mainlanders be moved to the military camps located in the hills.¹²² At 4:00 P.M. on March 5, Ma Yu-yüeh and a crowd went to the military camp outside the city and presented the Hua-lien district chief, Chang, with the resolutions. Chang agreed to the demands and then broadcast his acceptance on radio.

At 10:00 P.M. on March 6, some committee representatives requested that district officer Chang and the military camp commander, army Captain Wang, order all military and civil police to give up their weapons, but they refused. That same day, the committee, led by Hsü Hsi-ch'ien, reorganized various subcommittees and made the following proposals. First, Hsü Hsi-ch'ien should take charge of security. Second, Hsü Hsi-ch'ien and Lin Ming-yung should give a briefing about their negotiations with the government through radio broadcasts. Third, The Resolution Committee should be advised that judges, school principals, and district attorneys should be Taiwanese. Also, at least half of the government employees should be Taiwanese.¹²³

Although no violence occurred in Hua-lien on March 6 and 7, tension continued. Then at 10:00 A.M. on March 7, Hsü Hsi-ch'ien called a meeting to establish the Taiwan Self-Governing Alliance's Hua-lien Branch Office. Hsü became the supreme commander of the branch office's air

force, navy, and army. He went on the air to appeal to all young people to unite against the government, saying that the time had now arrived for Taiwan to have self-rule.¹²⁴

On March 8, Hsü Hsi-ch'ien summoned the young people of Hua-lien to meet in front of Chung-shan Park for training exercises. The Resolution Committee assembled at 10:00 A.M. and passed additional resolutions involving the administrative organization of the committee.¹²⁵

On March 9 at another meeting of the Resolution Committee, members agreed that they should neither act on their own nor join the Communists. At 2:00 P.M., the Resolution Committee selected candidates who might serve as the new Hua-lien district chief. They were Chang Ch'i-lang, Ma Yu-yüeh, and Lai Ch'iu-sung. About this same time, a group of youth and some returnees from abroad tried to form an assassin group to threaten local elites and persons from the military and government.¹²⁶

On March 10, government troops arrived in Taipei, and the Taiwan Provincial Administrative Executive Office immediately went on the air, ordering that all district Resolution Committees be abolished. The Hua-lien Committee held an emergency meeting, and after some discussion, all attending agreed to support the government's order. They immediately dissolved the Resolution Committee and passed three resolutions:¹²⁷

1. Organize a Food Grain Adjustment Committee with Ma Yu-yüeh as the chairman.
2. Pay respect to the local Security Bureau and send some money to that bureau.
3. Send funds to the Hua-lien City Fire Department, and request that the military police and local police resume responsibility for law and order.

On March 11, normalcy returned to the city, and on March 17, central government troops entered the city.

The Pescadores

Further south lay the Pescadore Islands, where radio broadcasts from Chia-i city provided the main source of news. On hearing of the Taipei uprising, some activists and ex-military people in Ma-kung who had served with the Japanese on Hainan Island planned to attack the city's police bureau and capture all weapons. However, the district chief heard about the plan and ordered the police bureau to place all weapons in a storehouse. On March 5, a number of people assembled to discuss how to organize a Resolution Committee and how to organize youth.¹²⁸ There

was considerable opposition to such activities because the district chief of the Pescadore Islands had won the respect and admiration of most of the people in the islands. Thus there was no uprising and no formation of local citizens' groups in the Pescadore Islands as there was in other cities throughout Taiwan.

The Pattern of the Uprising and the Role of the Communists

Like a firestorm sweeping through a forest, between February 28 and March 3, crowds took to the streets in all the major cities of Taiwan except in the Pescadores. They formed spontaneously to assault and beat Mainlanders, killing many, occupied city office buildings and radio stations, set upon the offices of the provincial Monopoly Bureau, seized grain stored in government warehouses, and attacked police stations as well as stealing arms and ammunition. Young people, many of them unemployed and formerly of the Japanese armed forces, and members of underground groups were conspicuous participants.

Quickly, however, many responsible Taiwanese officials and members of the elite came forward to offer the cities their leadership to fill the vacuum created by Mainlander officials who had fled to the countryside and nearby towns and airfields, seeking protection under the military police, Nationalist troops, and remnants of the police. These new leaders rapidly formed Resolution Committees, held daily mass meetings to listen to popular complaints and demands, and tried to restore city services as well as end the violence. Young leaders also appeared to press their radical demands and establish paramilitary organizations to help maintain urban order as well as to attack roving bands of provincial military police, Nationalist troops, and police trying to protect government property and regain city control.

In the first week of the Uprising, Resolution Committees seemed to follow the example of one in Taipei and formulate demands to provincial and Nationalist officials to resolve local grievances and restore order and calm. At these daily committee meetings heated discussion and debate produced a mixture of practical and unrealistic demands to the provincial authorities. No single leader could dominate these sessions and establish any control.

By March 8 and 9, reports quickly spread throughout the island that central government troops were landing in Keelung and being deployed to the central and southern parts of the island to occupy the major cities and restore provincial administration rule. The Resolution Committees in each

city rapidly dissolved. The numerous paramilitary units also melted away, though some took to the hills to offer guerrilla resistance to Nationalist forces.

In this turbulent period, those who formed and led the Resolution Committees and organized the paramilitary units were a mix of members of local elites and unknown young people. There seems to have been no particular group, either political or religious, which provided leadership to instigate this urban rebellion and organize the Resolution Committees to control mass violence and anger. The historical record strongly indicates that groups like the Taiwan Communists played no role in fomenting the rebellion or taking advantage of the initial violence to direct mass dissent. Given the later charges that Taiwan Communists did play an important role in the rebellion, some remarks on this issue are in order, but we must go back to the period of Japanese colonialism and then sum up the relevant events in the spring of 1947.

In April 1928, the Japanese Communist Party sent Nabeyama Sadachika to meet with a group of Taiwanese in Shanghai in order to set up the Taiwanese Communist Party.¹²⁹ After the conference, some Taiwanese Communists returned to Taiwan and attempted to build a revolutionary movement. Within seven years, they had either been arrested or had fled to the Mainland, where they went to Yen-an to link up with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).¹³⁰ Those who reached Yen-an were helped by the CCP to establish the Taiwan Provincial Work Committee (*T'ai-wan-sheng kung-tso wei-yüan-hui*). In late 1945, leading members of the Work Committee, like Ts'ai Hsiao-chien, Li Yu-san, and others, secretly returned to Taiwan to establish organizations that might eventually serve as a network to support Communist operations on the island.¹³¹

Already a leading Communist in Taiwan, Hsieh Hsüeh-hung later was a leader in the Uprising in the Taichung area. Her life tells us something about the Communist experience in Taiwan. Hsieh Hsüeh-hung (née A-nü) was born on October 17, 1901, in Chang-hua, in southern Taiwan, into a poor family.¹³² When she was twelve, both her parents died. She went to the home of her mother's sister, who raised her. When fifteen, she became the concubine of Hung Ch'un-jung, who worked in Taichung. At the age of seventeen, she escaped to Tainan and worked in the sugar fields, where she learned to read and write Chinese and Japanese. When twenty-one, in about 1922, she returned to Taichung, became a seamstress, and saved enough money to open a small store. Shortly thereafter, she went to the Mainland and began an odyssey that eventually catapulted her into the top echelon of the Taiwan Communist Party (TCP).

She studied in Shanghai, and there she began associating with Com-

munists, who eventually sent her to Moscow to study. She attended the important April 1928 meeting in Shanghai and became a member of the TCP's Central Committee. With other comrades, she returned to Taiwan and became active in the Taiwan Cultural Association. She also joined the farmer associations to demand better working conditions for tenants and farm laborers. She continued her Party work and helped manage a bookstore in the T'ai-p'ing section of Taipei with a man named Yang K'o-p'ei.

Sometime in the 1930s, a violent factional struggle broke out in the TCP over who should become the next Party leader, and someone informed the Japanese police about Hsieh's activities. The police arrested her, and she was sentenced to thirteen years in prison. In 1939 the authorities released her because of severe illness, and she went to Taichung to live with Yang K'o-p'ei's younger brother Yang K'o-huang.¹³³ She opened a bar called The Glorious Nightclub (*Ta-hua chiu-chia*) and continued her secret Party work. After Taiwan's retrocession, Hsieh set up new Party operations in Taichung by creating the Taiwan Liberation Alliance (*T'ai-wan chieh-fang t'ung-meng*), which sent a delegate to Shanghai to contact the Chinese Communist liaison unit there.

The CCP had established a liaison unit in Shanghai (the *Hua-tung-chü*) and a branch office in Hong Kong called the Taiwan Work Team Hong Kong Liaison Branch Office (*T'ai-wan kung-tso hsiao-tsu Hsiang-kang lien-lo-chan*). Both units maintained communication with Ts'ai Hsiao-chien, who was trying to organize party cells on the island.¹³⁴ Because Ts'ai had not been in Taiwan since late August 1928, and was thus unfamiliar with conditions on the island, his activities bore little fruit.

Throughout late 1945 and early 1946, other Taiwanese Communist cadres began making contact with underworld elements (*liu-mang*) and various activists to drive a wedge between the Taiwanese and Mainlanders. Sometime in 1946, the CCP sent Chang Chih-chung to Taiwan to create a formal party structure called the Chinese Communist Taiwan Provincial Work Committee (*Chung-kung T'ai-wan-sheng kung-tso wei-yüan-hui*) and to follow a new strategy. Party cadres would enlist the support of middle- and upper-echelon intellectuals and popular local leaders to criticize Mainland rule. This same group also organized various underground units called the Taiwan Heroic Army (*T'ai-wan i-yung-chün*), the Taiwanese Communist Youth League (*T'ai-wan kung-ch'an-chu-i ch'ing-nien-t'uan*), and the Taiwan Work Team (*T'ai-wan kung-tso-t'uan*) to exploit the growing tensions between the people and the Kuomintang.¹³⁵

The provincial administration's Security Bureau eventually learned about TCP activities and worried that the rumors spread by the TCP

would succeed in aggravating tensions. The Security Bureau immediately ordered all police units to watch for any Communist activities and arrest TCP members.¹³⁶ However, the police and intelligence units still lacked reliable informants among the local people, and few Communists were arrested before the Uprising. Only a few weeks before the Uprising, the administration had obtained information that "there are people circulating revolutionary tracts and also saying that Communism is much better than the Three Principles of the People. . . . Therefore, the feelings of the people have been brought to a boiling point."¹³⁷

After the Uprising, the Chinese Communist Party still tried to remain in contact with the TCP by publicly communicating with it. For example, on March 8, *Chieh-fang jih-pao* (*Liberation Daily*) reported the Taiwan Uprising, explained why it had occurred, and gave explicit instructions for the TCP to act.¹³⁸ Communists did, in fact, act. The best example is Hsieh Hsüeh-hung, a leader in Taichung. She helped organize a Resolution Committee and demanded that the Taiwanese govern the island. But very few of the Taiwanese who demanded reforms and self-rule were Communists. Our evidence clearly shows that Taiwanese supporters of the Nationalists, not Communists, dominated the Resolution Committees.

Moreover, the government's charge that Hsieh led the famous Twenty-seventh Militia Corps is incorrect, according to Chung I-jen, who was jailed in Taiwan until 1987. In his memoirs, published in 1988, Chung says that he and several others founded the Twenty-seventh Militia Corps at 4:00 P.M. on March 4, 1947. They wanted to set up self-government so that local groups could negotiate effectively with the central government.¹³⁹ The unit was able to mobilize some 4,000 men, some of whom had served in the Japanese army or had been trained by Japanese officers in Taiwan.¹⁴⁰ Chung, not Hsieh, commanded the unit when it used guerrilla tactics to resist Nationalist military forces. Hsieh merely sought its temporary protection when she escaped to Hong Kong in April 1947.¹⁴¹

When Nationalist forces captured Chung and other leaders, Chung lied to his Nationalist interrogators, claiming that Hsieh, not he, was the commander of the Twenty-seventh Militia Corps.¹⁴² His testimony may have misled the authorities into believing that Communists like Hsieh played a much more important role in the Uprising than they actually had. In his memoirs, Chung I-jen also says that the Taiwanese, at least those he knew in his home town of Taichung, had no sympathy for Communists and their ideology. In his view, many decades of Japanese anti-Communist education and surveillance had strongly influenced the Taiwanese, leading them to mistrust Communism.¹⁴³

A former Taiwanese Communist reported that the four leading cadres

sent to Taiwan by the CCP to conduct Party work failed to coordinate with each other and never established any solid link with mass organizations.¹⁴⁴ At the time of the Uprising, he claimed, the CCP had no influence on the island and could not have orchestrated the urban riots.

Central government leaders, therefore, exaggerated the strength of TCP members and their role in the Uprising. Chiang Kai-shek might have been misled by the information from Taipei. When he informed the Kuomintang Central Committee on March 10 that Communist activity was one cause of the February 28 Uprising,¹⁴⁵ it is unclear whether he meant that it was the chief cause. If he did, his view did not accord with the facts.

Our analysis in this chapter demonstrates that the main tensions and circumstances leading to the Uprising had little to do with sporadic Communist activities. This viewpoint was also expressed in the April 1946 government report, publicly released in March 1988, by the censor of Fukien and Taiwan, Yang Liang-kung.¹⁴⁶ The multicausal analysis in this secret report bears some similarity to our own.

Other government statements leave the same impression. On March 31, 1947, Ch'en I addressed his staff, saying, "What caused the Incident is the poisonous propaganda and ideas produced by 51 years of Japanese rule. The Taiwanese behaved as though they should oppose only our country's people; and there was also a group of people who blindly followed the agitators."¹⁴⁷ Ch'en I then added, "Those who thought like the Japanese and opposed us were young people under 35 years of age, most of whom did not know anything about China and only looked down on the Chinese, soiled the cultural system of China, and considered that nothing was as good as the Japanese. Such people have forgotten that their ancestors were Chinese."¹⁴⁸ While speaking these angry words, Ch'en made no mention of Communists instigating the Uprising. Blaming Japanese cultural influence for alienating Taiwanese from China, Ch'en I believed that only intensive education of the Taiwanese could prevent another uprising. In a report to his staff in April 1947, Ch'en I urged that the provincial government's printing office publish a series of books on the eight years of heroic struggle during which the Chinese people resisted Japan, print works on Chinese morality, and extol China's great culture. Ch'en I also wanted "all schools in the province to have a flag-raising ceremony each day, with the school principal or a teacher teaching the students how to become pure Chinese."¹⁴⁹ Clearly, he was worrying not about Communist influence but about lack of Chinese patriotism.

Other leading Nationalist officials also minimized the role played by the Communists. In April 1947, KMT Party and military officials held a meeting in Kaohsiung to discuss measures to prevent another uprising. Ad-

dressing P'eng Meng-ch'i, then head of the Provincial Garrison Command, a Taiwanese talked about his experience during the Uprising: "When T'u Kuang-ming led some underworld elements to riot, steal, and beat Mainlanders, I saved many of their lives. However, there were two wounded Mainlanders who were carrying communication wire in their hands. One refused my efforts to help him. I thought at that time he must definitely be a Communist."¹⁵⁰ P'eng then replied, "Very good. I hope each of you will give me that kind of information. This shows how well the military and civilians can cooperate."¹⁵¹

P'eng, however, did not say that Communists had caused the Uprising. Again, on May 31, 1947, a reporter asked P'eng, "In Chairman Chiang's statements, he clearly says that the Chinese Communists exploited the incident. I would like to ask His Excellency how they did that."¹⁵² P'eng replied:

Traitors broke our country's laws, endangered social harmony, and aroused the people's hatred. Taiwan's situation is a security matter in international and Chinese terms. Our people suffered for 51 years, experienced many historical lessons, and developed a great tolerance for hardship. They simply will not let themselves be harmed by scheming people. If only a few traitors and their followers unfortunately stir up an "incident," the responsible officers of the Garrison Command absolutely will not forgive them.¹⁵³

Clearly, P'eng did not answer the journalist's question, nor did he say that the "traitors" who caused the Uprising were Taiwanese Communists. He merely blamed traitors and their followers for the Uprising. If P'eng had thought the traitors were Communist, why did he not mention "Communists" (*kung-fei*) instead of "traitors" (*chien-t'u*)? Various Chinese journalists also reported that the Taiwan Communists were never a major factor in causing the so-called Incident.¹⁵⁴

CHAPTER 5

The Nationalists' Response

ON MARCH 26, 1947, a reporter asked General P'eng Meng-chi how many people had been killed or wounded in the Incident. P'eng replied that 16 officers had been killed, 135 had been wounded, and 3 were missing; 74 soldiers had died, 262 had been wounded, and 37 were missing; 64 government civil servants were dead, 1,244 were wounded, and 24 missing. He estimated 1,431 Mainlander and 632 Taiwanese casualties altogether.¹ Around that same time, the provincial administration reported 33 civil servants killed, 866 wounded and 7 missing—all of whom were Mainlanders. Mainlander casualties thus probably came to more than 1,000.²

Moreover, overall damage was great, if not adjusted for inflation. Official estimates of damage to public property ran as high as 175,097,331 old Taiwan dollars and damage to private property as high as 441,373,280 old Taiwan dollars—a total of 616,470,611. Another estimate placed "the loss of production output caused by the stoppage of private and publicly owned enterprises" at around 550 million, making the grand total of damage slightly over 1 billion old Taiwan dollars,³ though this figure may include losses suffered as a result of the actions of Nationalist forces. However, the sum of 1 billion old Taiwan dollars, if adjusted for inflation, represented less than 1 percent of Taiwan's real net domestic product in 1947.⁴

The nominally high figure for damage as well as the number of Mainlander casualties created the impression of a major rebellion, as did repeated rebel demands that the Nationalists disarm and for all practical purposes let the rebels rule Taiwan. This perception of a major rebellion was undoubtedly shared by the Mainlander elite, who had always attached great importance to having Taiwan securely under ROC rule. If Taiwan's security were jeopardized, the Nationalist leadership would be determined to make the province secure. It is not surprising, then, that Nanking's leaders used force to suppress the Uprising.

The Nationalists' Shift from Conciliation to the Use of Force

Chiang Kai-shek had learned about the Taipei Uprising on February 28. He noted in his diary that a Monopoly Bureau official "unfortunately had fired his gun in self-defense, mistakenly killing a person."⁵ Chiang then continued, "Communist elements and other evil groups stirred up crowds of people, and on the afternoon of February 28, attacked the Taipei Monopoly Bureau Section Office, beating to death two officials, severely wounding the deputy director, Ou-yang Cheng-chai, and four other people. They looted public stores, openly attacked government organs, and killed and wounded Mainlanders." Chiang lamented that "in a single moment, social harmony had turned into a great disturbance (*ta-luan*)." Moreover, just as an uprising was breaking out in Taiwan, new crises were erupting on the Mainland.

Since General Marshall's recall to the United States from China some weeks earlier, on January 6, 1947, talks had broken down between Communist and Nationalist teams negotiating a truce. In late February, a massive Communist offensive in Kirin province threatened Ch'ang-ch'ün city. On March 1, 1947, Communist troops had driven within seven miles of the city, forcing the Nationalists to abandon the airfield, evacuate personnel, and send 10,000 reinforcements to the area.⁶ At the same time, Communist delegates in Chungking were packing their bags and hastily departing for Yenan. The civil war was breaking out all over China. Soon Chiang was reshuffling military units in north China to thwart the Communists. Then on March 1, Chiang faced yet another crisis, this time within his government in Nanking. Premier T. V. Soong (Sung Tzu-wen) of the Executive Yüan resigned.⁷

The news from Taipei was so bleak that Chiang wrote in his diary on Wednesday, March 5, "The Taiwan incident already has become a rebellion and an attempt to seize government organs. Moreover, this Uprising already has spread throughout the north of the island and to Taichung, Chia-i, and other district cities."⁸ That same day, Chiang decided to send the Twenty-first Division under General Liu Yü-ch'ing to Taiwan.⁹ By Thursday, Ch'en I had begun to realize that he would probably need reinforcements, and had wired Chiang, discussing why the Uprising had occurred and suggesting means of restoring order. He blamed four groups for starting the Uprising: Communists among those Taiwanese who had recently returned from overseas, especially from Hainan Island; some of the Japanese who had not yet been repatriated to Japan; members of the

Taiwanese elite and radicals who had opposed his provincial government from the outset of Taiwan's retrocession; and ordinary Taiwanese who, he said, lacked national spirit and had gone astray because of their traditional way of thinking.¹⁰ Ch'en I then suggested the following measures to deal with the Uprising: The people's thinking and attitudes should be changed and the political system improved to increase popular confidence in the government so that the people would not be misled by "evil forces." Evil elements and rebels should not be tolerated, however, and must be destroyed by military force.¹¹

In the meantime, more views about the origin of the Uprising had reached Chiang. A special Security Bureau report sent to Chiang on March 6 cited causes different from the ones adduced by Ch'en I.¹² This report noted the impact of inflation and unemployment in 1946 and early 1947; the way economic recovery had been set back by the Monopoly Bureau and provincial public enterprises, which had absorbed so much of what had been private activity; official corruption within the provincial administration; and finally, the language barrier between Taiwanese and Mainlanders. The report then stated that the proximate factors causing the Uprising were the acute shortage of food grain in January and February 1947, and government control over domestic and foreign trade, which had alienated Taiwanese business people.¹³

Another report received by Chiang Kai-shek on March 6 came from Huang Ch'ao-ch'in, speaker and head of the Taiwan Provincial Council. Huang stated that the violence in Taiwan was worsening because the people had lost confidence in the provincial administration. He begged Chiang, "Decide quickly how to govern Taiwan and speedily send officials here to prevent the Uprising from becoming so bad that even the foreigners will have only contempt for us."¹⁴

Reacting to this information, Chiang wired Ch'en I on March 7:

The American Embassy has received a telegram from its consul in Taiwan requesting aircraft to evacuate U.S. personnel and their families. They believe the situation in Taiwan might worsen.

At the same time, I received a wire from the Taiwan Political Enforcement Committee via a foreign consulate, asking me to send troops to Taiwan or else the situation will become more serious.

I did not pay very much attention to the report because I knew that some rebels might be spreading rumors abroad about Taiwan.

What is the recent situation? Please report to me immediately.¹⁵

Meanwhile, leading officials in the Ministry of Defense urged that major action be taken to restore order in Taiwan. On March 8, Wang Ch'ung-hui, the general secretary to the Supreme Commission of the Ministry of

Defense, wired Chiang Kai-shek that conditions were becoming critical. He suggested that the central government send top officials to Taiwan to confer with leading Taiwanese and calm their fears; that the Taiwan provincial government be restructured to give it the same form as any other provincial administration; and that additional Taiwanese be employed immediately in the administration.¹⁶ Thus, from the outset the KMT was aware of both the need for troop reinforcements and the need for reform.

That same day, Saturday, Chiang again wired to Ch'en I, asking for a detailed report on the available weapons and ammunition. "If rebels try to seize these items, why not destroy them first? At present, however, you should control them tightly."¹⁷ Ch'en I immediately replied to Chiang that there were 456 warehouses with military stores, containing more than 10,000 rifles and 300 artillery pieces, and that half of the stored food grain, uniforms, and daily supplies had been stolen.¹⁸ That same day, Ch'en I again wired Chiang Kai-shek, with a request:

In order to prevent chaos when the national army's units arrive, beginning around March 10, we should have the air force distribute propaganda leaflets over Taiwan. Their contents should read: Trust in Governor-General Ch'en and his reasonable political reforms; all students should return to their schools; return to work, do not believe rumors, and do not be manipulated by ambitious opportunists; the national army comes to protect the people, so do not panic; let bygones be bygones and assist the government to maintain order; respect the Constitution and obey the law.

I already asked the air force commander, General Chou, to assist me. Please grant my request.¹⁹

At about the same time that Chiang received Ch'en I's wire, he received a report from the director of the Central Investigation and Statistics Bureau (*Chung-t'ung-chü*), Chang Chen, warning that the Taiwanese would resist if the central government used military force to restore order and that on March 5 a group of 600-odd aborigines had encircled and attacked a Nationalist battalion.²⁰

So far, Chiang Kai-shek had been receiving more and more information about the complex causes of the Uprising and its seriousness. As additional information was assembled in the next few days, it became clear to Chiang and the Ministry of Defense that they had been correct when they decided on March 5 to send the Twenty-first Division to Taiwan to restore order.²¹ However, the division had still not left Shanghai. On March 7, Taiwan's KMT party director, Li I-chung, reported to Chiang on conditions in Taiwan and means of resolving the crisis.²² Then on March 8, Chiang telegraphed this message to Ch'en I:

How to deal with the current conditions? We have continually deliberated. I conferred with Li I-chung, and we have considered a plan to resolve the crisis. I have already sent two warships to Keelung, and these ships will probably arrive on March 9 or 10. [Actually, three destroyers had reached Keelung on March 5.] Two contingents of the Twenty-first Division will depart from Shanghai tomorrow. Division Commander Liu Yü-ch'ing will fly to Taipei tomorrow to confer directly with you about all matters.²³

That same day, March 8, a high-level meeting at the Ministry of Defense produced a new course of action for the central government: A mission of top officials would be sent to Taiwan to help restore order. The current administration on the island would be quickly restructured and called the Taiwan Provincial Government. At the same time, every effort would be made to staff new positions with able Taiwanese.

On Saturday, as the central government was completing its policy review, concluding that additional troops must be transferred back to Taiwan despite the Mainland crisis, the Taipei Resolution Committee adopted a more moderate tone. Having re-evaluated its 32 Demands to the central government, it publicly announced that it would retract many of them:

After examining the 32 Demands submitted to Governor Ch'en I on March 7 by this committee, we now realize that too many people participated in that action, and that the demands to abolish the Garrison Command and to disarm the Nationalist forces really were demands to oppose the central government and did not correctly represent the will of the people. Moreover, our request to abolish the Monopoly Bureau was supported by business people but opposed by the working people. These demands simply did not represent the people's real desires. We now want to reconsider some of these proposals. We recognize that Governor-General Ch'en I has decided to reform the Executive Office [of the Taiwan Provincial Government] and that he will try to select more of the able Taiwanese for official posts and as district officials. While reforming the administrative system, the provincial government alone will determine the course of reform. Your Excellency has already ordered district and city councils to begin this work so that local and provincial elections can be held and preparations for holding them made. In this way, the people of this province can participate in the management of their affairs. Therefore, from now on, this province's administration will actually represent the people's will. As for other reforms, we have no other recommendations to offer, and we have already commented on them. This committee already recognizes that the provincial reforms it has proposed have nearly been realized. From now on, this committee's duties are to encourage a return to normalcy, secure the people's livelihood, and hope that our compatriots on Taiwan will quickly return to their normal lives. We urge that everyone work hard, and that all students return to their classrooms by next Monday. We also hope that all workers from today on will return to their factories, and that the military police and regular police will cooperate to maintain law and order. Further, we request that all private and

people refuse to obey the law and do not follow the natural way of the people, preferring to try to take advantage of the current situation, we ask the people to reject them.²⁴

Then the Resolution Committee exhorted the people to "purify the government and strive for reform of the provincial political system," concluding its announcement with a new slogan: "Our motto is reform of the Taiwan political system."

Once again, however, dissidents in the streets remained beyond the control of negotiators. At 10:00 P.M. that same day, Saturday, extremists in Taipei attacked the Executive Office, the Garrison Command Headquarters, the police and Military Police offices, other governmental offices, and banks. Within an hour, military reinforcements had pushed back the attackers and restored order.²⁵ Yet disturbances continued throughout the Taipei-Keelung region.

At the same time, the rumored arrival of Nationalist troops made Taiwanese increasingly apprehensive. Shops closed, and few people ventured forth. Tensions ran high in Keelung, where all central government troops would have to debark. Militants had tried to persuade Keelung port workers to bomb the port to prevent troop landings, but the Keelung Garrison Command Headquarters learned of this plan when its men discovered some twenty vehicles packed with explosives intended for use in blowing up piers.²⁶ That night, Saturday, March 8, hundreds of activists attacked the Keelung Garrison Command Headquarters, but the military police repulsed them and restored order. Later that same night, a battalion of military police arrived in Keelung from Fukien with a platoon of thirty soldiers to escort the censor, Yang Liang-kung. These were the first troop reinforcements to debark. Yang and his escorts made their way to Pa-tu through a highway tunnel, where they were attacked by extremists. One of Yang's companions was wounded, but Yang and his chauffeur escaped unharmed. At 2:00 A.M. on Sunday, March 9, Yang and his escorts arrived at the Taipei Garrison Command.²⁷ That same day, troop ships arrived in Keelung.

The Garrison Command imposed martial law at 6:00 A.M. on March 9 because of fighting on March 8 just north of Taipei city in the Yüan-shan area.²⁸ Chief of the General-Staff General K'ö Yüan-fen ordered troops to take over the radio broadcasting stations, transport facilities, water and electrical utilities, and so on. K'ö then announced by radio that all public assembly would cease and that unofficial organizations like the Resolution Committee must be dissolved. That afternoon at 2:00 P.M., the railroad between Keelung and Taipei began operations. By the evening

of March 9, Sunday, one battalion from the 21st Regiment and another battalion from the 4th Regiment of Military Police had landed in Keelung, having left Shanghai the day before.²⁹ General K'ö then sent more troops to Chia-i by air, and the Pioneer Regiment went by truck to Taichung to restore order. After fighting in Keelung, in which troops carried out random killings, the main force of the Twenty-first Division moved into Taipei to suppress the sporadic fighting at the city's railway station, the office of the governor, the Garrison Command, and the Military Police headquarters.

On Monday, March 10, two divisions of central government troops arrived in Kaohsiung. Some troops went to Taipei and southward; others headed toward I-lan and Hua-lien on the east coast. Thus, the process of troop reinforcement, first decided on by Chiang on Wednesday, March 5, culminated in the landing of troops in Taiwan from Saturday through Monday, March 8-10.

On March 10, Chiang Kai-shek made his first public statement about the Taiwan Uprising, speaking out against the background of the troop landings:

The reasons for the unfortunate incident in Taiwan have been reported in the newspapers, and I need not repeat them in detail. Since our recovery of Taiwan last year, the central government regarded the state of the harmony and order in Taiwan as very satisfactory, and we did not send troops to be stationed there. Moreover, the military and civil police were sufficient to maintain local order and law. Last year, people in commerce, industry, and agriculture were law-abiding and sincere in their loyalty to the government. This spirit of patriotism and self-respect is no different from that of the Chinese people in other provinces. Recently, however, some people formerly mobilized by the Japanese and sent to the South-east Asian theater to fight—and some Communists among them—took advantage of the Monopoly Bureau's smuggling case to promote their own ends and create a disturbance. They also demanded political reforms. The central government considers that the Constitution will be upheld and, moreover, it will be applied to Taiwan so that normalcy can quickly return. Because our Constitution limits the central government's powers, the central government has only limited power over local administrations. Governor-General Ch'en has followed the instructions of the central government and has decided to change the structure of government in Taiwan, replacing the Executive Office of the Taiwan provincial government. Within a defined period of time, he will implement local elections for district officials, and the people of Taiwan can express their hopes and desires. Therefore, this unfortunate incident could have ended. However, last Friday, March 7, the so-called February 28th Incident Resolution Committee unexpectedly made some irrational demands. That committee demanded that the government abolish the Taiwan Garrison Command Headquarters, that the Nationalist forces surrender their weapons, and that all security organs and the army and navy be staffed only

with Taiwanese. These demands go beyond the jurisdiction of the local administration, and the central government cannot accept them. Moreover, yesterday many people illegally attacked government administrative organs. Because these incidents have repeatedly happened, the central government has decided to dispatch a military force to Taiwan to maintain security. It has been reported that a military force already has safely landed in Keelung and that harmony has been restored. We believe that normalcy everywhere will soon be established. We are also going to send a top-ranking official to Taiwan to help resolve the troubles. I have already telegraphed to military and political leaders and other staff personnel, ordering them to maintain discipline. Do not be taken in by evil persons, and do not be deceived by Japanese-style deceit. If that happens, great harm will come to our country.³⁰

Chiang's statement on Monday thus pinpointed the aspects of the Taiwan situation significant in his eyes. He had counted on maintaining order there with a minimal troop presence: "We did not send troops to be stationed there." Indeed, as we have seen, troop transfers back to the Mainland in 1946 reduced the total police-troop presence to 6 percent of the Japanese level. The remaining small contingent available for security could not contain the Uprising and, just as obviously, no uprising had been possible when a couple of divisions were stationed in Taiwan. Thus, when he spoke out on Monday against the backdrop of the landings that began on Saturday, Chiang knew that the ROC's sovereignty was no longer challenged. He also made clear that his government would not accept the 32 Demands of the Taipei Resolution Committee, which the Committee had tried to retract on Saturday.

To be sure, Chiang had already decided the previous Wednesday, March 5, to send reinforcements. Moreover, on Thursday, March 6, Ch'en I had wired asking for troop reinforcements. A week had passed since Ch'en Wen-hsi had been killed in the T'ai-p'ing Street area on Thursday, February 27. What if by Monday, March 3, or Tuesday, March 4, mob violence had ceased, dissidents throughout Taiwan had decided to follow the lead of the Taipei Resolution Committee, and the committee had limited its demands to what we have called the question of culpability and to the reform of local government, instead of making its revolutionary demands on Friday, March 7? Would Ch'en I and Chiang Kai-shek have then sighed with relief, saved their troops for the deepening Mainland crisis, and pursued in Taiwan the measures that Ch'en I had set forth in his radio broadcast on Sunday, March 2, at 3:00 P.M.? (In that broadcast, he had offered leniency to all suspected of participating in the Uprising, compensation to the families of people killed or hurt by the government, and an extension of political participation.) Would Ch'en then have carried out

the democratization process he set forth as late as Thursday, March 6, the same day he asked Chiang for troop reinforcements?

Or was Ch'en simply playing for time on Thursday, trying to placate the extremists with offers of democratization, but having already decided to crush them militarily? If that was his state of mind on Thursday, was that also his view the previous Sunday? Or was he on Sunday hoping to avoid the need for troop transfers then or later? Without troop reinforcements, his administration could be stabilized only by conciliating the dissidents and basing stability on popular acceptance of the administration instead of on a large military presence.

We have argued that because Ch'en and Chiang wanted to avoid transferring back to Taiwan troops urgently needed on the Mainland, Ch'en was sincerely seeking conciliation on Sunday, March 2. His decision on Wednesday and Thursday to seek a military solution was reluctantly made in response to the escalation of the rebellion and to the inability of the Taipei Resolution Committee to implement an understanding that would not challenge ROC sovereignty.

At any rate, having concluded that troop transfers were needed to uphold the ROC's sovereignty in Taiwan, Chiang also wired Ch'en I on March 13 not to take revenge on the Taiwanese: "I ask that you strongly restrain your forces, preventing them from taking revenge; I will consider any other conduct as disobeying my orders."³¹ Ch'en I immediately wired back that he would vigorously carry out Chiang's order.³² Ch'en I then ordered all troops under his command to "take prompt and effective action to wipe out these mutinous and lawless individuals in order to maintain the stability of the province."³³ He emphasized that there were no differences between Taiwanese and Mainlanders and warned his officers and men not to "plunder or shoot law-abiding people on any pretext." If proof could be provided that anyone had violated this order, he would receive a sentence of summary execution.³⁴

Earlier on March 10, Ch'en I informed the people by radio that military forces were coming to Taiwan to protect them and to suppress only those elements who had rebelled against the central government. The troops "would not be used for any other purposes."³⁵ Ch'en then chided the Taiwanese for their broken promises and condemned their seditious behavior.

To those who had used the Resolution Committee to demand that laws be changed, I responded that I would meet those demands. I then expected that after my agreeing to your demands, law and order would be restored. However, on March 11, after I had lifted martial law, firearms were still used and property destroyed in

the Taipei area, and people attacked government warehouses. The violence still continued, and then you published those articles against the country. Moreover, in every district and city armed violence took place. Officials were attacked, and government organs were besieged. . . . After the February 28 riots broke out, you wanted to resolve the problem of compensating the wounded and punishing those responsible for smuggling contraband. But then your demands extended to reforming the political system. Some among you even took advantage of this situation and spread rumors to make this situation even more serious.³⁶

Finally, Ch'en I announced that martial law would be continued, and six measures enforced:

1. The staff of all transportation organs, whether railroad or highway, must return to their work; everyone will obey, and anyone refusing will be severely punished.
2. All workers will return to their factories; shops will open their doors; everyone will return to work.
3. All demonstrations are strictly prohibited.
4. No one will use titles or names to raise money from the people.
5. No commodity prices will be increased.
6. All illegal behavior will be severely punished.³⁷

On Tuesday, March 11 at 8:00 P.M., Ch'en I again ordered that all Resolution Committees be abolished. He accused their members of failing to help the wounded during the disturbances. He denounced the Taipei Resolution Committee for having gone too far when it submitted the 32 Demands on March 7.³⁸ On March 12, General K'ö Yüan-fen spoke on the radio to the Taiwanese people. He attacked extremists who had wanted to abolish the Garrison Command Headquarters, and he hoped that all the people and the nation could cooperate and restore harmony.³⁹

Also on Wednesday, March 12, General Pai Ch'ung-hsi forwarded to Chiang Kai-shek two letters received from K'ö Yüan-fen and Ch'en I.⁴⁰ Both K'ö and Ch'en reported to Chiang that troops had arrived and restored order. Ch'en stated that he had delegated Garrison Command duties to K'ö. On the next day, Ch'en I sent a long report to Chiang Kai-shek, again explaining why the Taiwan Uprising had occurred.⁴¹ Ch'en cited seven reasons for the Uprising and also tried to justify his policy of establishing publicly owned enterprises. Ch'en began by arguing that the Taiwanese had lost their understanding of Chinese culture and their spirit of nationalism because of 51 years of Japanese rule. He then blamed the press for criticizing his administration and for sowing seeds of dissension between Taiwanese and Mainlanders. He blamed the Japanese war-time mobilization programs for the anti-Chinese attitude of many urban

young people, especially those who had returned from places overseas, like Hainan Island. He also blamed Taiwanese business people for not recognizing how publicly owned enterprises had contributed to the island's recovery. Finally, he complained that because martial law had never been imposed in Taiwan and because civil law had been difficult to enforce, increasing numbers of people had unfairly blamed the provincial administration for not imposing law and order. In addition, he claimed that poor communications around the island made it impossible for Taiwanese officials on duty to leave their posts quickly when the Uprising broke out.

To restore stability, Ch'en I suggested the extension of martial law for a period of time, the holding of local elections, strict control of communications by Mainlanders, the speedy repatriation of all remaining Japanese, and the launching of a program in education and Chinese-language instruction. He concluded by advocating the continuation of his economic policies and the employment of more Taiwanese in the provincial administration.

On Thursday, March 13, two weeks after the Taipei Uprising began, Nationalist troops occupied every district on the island. Some extremists continued to resist, but superior Nationalist forces compelled them to scatter and flee. Urban transport and communication resumed. On March 14, Keelung came under martial law, and the Garrison Command imposed martial law in Taipei as well. On March 17, the defense minister of the Nanking central government, Pai Ch'ung-hsi, left for Taiwan. He issued Announcement No. 1, informing the people that he came only to investigate, report to the central government, and offer recommendations to resolve the recent crisis.

The Time of Terror

Between March 12 and May 15, when Wei Tao-ming replaced Ch'en I as provincial governor, two processes took place. Within the central government, Chiang Kai-shek and other officials introduced important personnel changes and reformed the Taiwan provincial government in order to win Taiwanese support for the Nationalists. Within Taiwan, Liu Yü-ch'ing's forces ferreted out bands of armed extremists, while provincial police and other groups carried out arrests. This was a time of terror for many Taiwanese. Killings occurred, trials were conducted, people involved in the recent Uprising were imprisoned, and in some cases innocent people were persecuted.

On March 17, Pai Ch'ung-hsi telegraphed Chiang from Taipei stating that he had conferred with Ch'en I, that peace had been restored

throughout the island, and that although some Communists and rebels were still armed and active, military forces were closely monitoring their movements.⁴² On the same day, Pai again cabled Chiang, having just learned that around 2,000 Communists and rebels had scattered to different areas, and that Liu Yü-ch'ing's troops, the military police, and personnel from the Fortress Headquarters were taking appropriate action to deal with them.⁴³ Pai also told Chiang that the 205th Regiment would be kept in reserve in case further disturbances broke out.

The same day, March 17, Ch'en I wired Chiang Kai-shek, offering to resign. Ch'en admitted that the Uprising had been caused by his misunderstanding of events and his lack of ability.⁴⁴ Ch'en I then said, "Please permit me to resign from both positions as the civil administration's governor-general and as the head of the Garrison Command."⁴⁵ Chiang wired back that Ch'en I had helped to put down the Uprising and that plans were under way to set up a new provincial government.⁴⁶ Chiang also said that Ch'en I's responsibility now was to maintain peace and order until the new administration was fully established.

On the next day, Chiang Kai-shek wired Pai Ch'ung-hsi, saying that Pai must be consulted about new administrative appointments in Taiwan: "As for appointment of provincial government personnel, you [Pai] should consult with the Executive Office [Governor-General Ch'en I] and work out a feasible plan to give me for my examination."⁴⁷ On March 19, Pai cabled to Chiang that most of the new administrators, as well as General Li Liang-jung, were from Minnan (southern Fukien). As Governor-General Ch'en I had spoken highly of Li, "it would be proper to place him in charge of military affairs."⁴⁸

On March 19, too, Pai Ch'ung-hsi received an urgent telegram from Chiang Kai-shek informing him of news just received from Liu Yü-ch'ing. One of Liu's units had been surrounded by armed rebels, and Liu's other troops had then chased the rebels to a locale named T'a-li, where heavy fighting was in progress.⁴⁹ Chiang urged Pai to pay special attention to the situation and to wipe out the rebels. However, he also said,

Never be careless in handling this problem, because any mistakes will only embolden the rebels. In particular, maintain military discipline and do not allow any troops to disturb the civilians. Therefore, you must supply the troops with enough materiel. Moreover, do not let the officers and soldiers make any excuses for violating military rules and discipline. If our main force pursues the rebels into the mountains, you must take great precautions. Please tell Commander Liu of these important orders.⁵⁰

It is not clear why Liu Yü-ch'ing informed Chiang Kai-shek of the new violence and did not report directly to General Pai Ch'ung-hsi. Nor is it

clear why Chiang did not cable a reply directly to Liu Yü-ch'ing instead of informing General Pai. Nevertheless, fighting in the hills of central Taiwan continued roughly a week after Nationalist troops had restored order in the major cities. However, by March 21 the fighting appears to have ceased entirely.

That same day, Pai Ch'ung-hsi cabled Chiang Kai-shek that "according to Governor-General Ch'en's plan for organizing the Taiwan Provincial Administration, there would be the following: fifteen commissioners, half to be Taiwanese, half to be Mainlanders, plus various administration bureau directors who would be Taiwanese as well."⁵¹ On March 24, General Pai submitted a long report to Chiang Kai-shek outlining his reasons for the Uprising.⁵² Pai blamed it on three factors: many Taiwanese, strongly influenced by the Japanese, had joined the Uprising to seek personal advantage; the Monopoly Bureau incident had caused crowds to form; and, finally, many of the young Taiwanese who had returned to the island in 1946, especially from Hainan Island, were Communists and hostile to the Nationalist administration. Chiang then informed Pai that he should return immediately to Nanking and discuss the selection of new personnel for the provincial administration.⁵³

On March 23, Pai again cabled Chiang, suggesting that all Taiwan provincial administration officials who had remained on the job and helped to restore peace and order be congratulated for their services. Pai then said,

The truth of this Incident is not simple. . . . I am visiting many places and making some careful investigations. As for how to manage matters in Taiwan, it is best to wait until I have completed my investigation, and then you can decide. I have read in the recent newspapers that many Taiwanese organizations on the Mainland have taken advantage of this Incident and already have made many demands. Please do not make any promises right now; otherwise, that might make for more difficulty later.⁵⁴

Chiang immediately replied, "Permission granted. We will await your complete tour and then make our decisions. I have not promised anything. I have decided not to go any further into the matter Governor-General Ch'en is investigating. Do not worry about that."⁵⁵

Meanwhile, other officials were sending Chiang Kai-shek their proposals for reforming the Taiwan provincial government. On March 25, Chiang Meng-lin sent a long memorandum offering his views. Finally, after many meetings,⁵⁶ Nanking decided that civil matters would be handled by the provincial governor and security matters by the Garrison Command. More Taiwanese personnel would be employed even if their training and background did not match regulation standards. "As for elections [local officials and mayors], the Taiwan provincial govern-

ment should discuss these with the Taiwan Provincial Council, and then work out a plan and submit it for approval to the central government."⁵⁷ Moreover, publicly owned enterprises should be reduced in number.

After March 17, Ch'en immediately shut down all newspapers critical of the provincial government. Police arrested journalists and suspended the *Chung-wai jih-pao*, *Jen-min tao-pao*, *Ta-ming-pao*, *Ch'ung-chien jih-pao*, and *Min-pao*.⁵⁸ One Mainlander newsman recalled that "the reason they were closed is that they represented different elements outside the Kuomintang Party. Further, they had stirred up bad feeling between the government and the people, and were deeply influenced by Japanese poisonous thought."⁵⁹ After Ting Wen-chieh, a reporter for Taichung's *Ho-p'ing jih-pao*, wrote that Liu Wen-tao, a member of the Legislative Yuan from Hupei province, had criticized Ch'en I and demanded that the central government investigate his administration, Ch'en I ordered Ting's arrest and closed down *Ho-p'ing jih-pao*.⁶⁰ He also recommended that the government discuss matters with the Taiwan Provincial Council, and then work out a plan. Ch'en I's administration also initiated a new census, a counting of households and population that began on April 5, 1947.⁶¹ Tremendous anxiety resulted from procedure 7 of the new census rules:

During the period of household enumeration, the household head must guarantee a survey and exposure of any traitors in the neighborhood association and in the unit to which the household belongs. Every village, town, and district neighborhood association head should have this guarantor system and be responsible for reporting to the census enumerator sent from the district and city administration. Henceforth, when a traitor is found in that household or within that neighborhood association, it will be the responsibility of the household head and the neighborhood association head to report to the officials of the township or the district police, who will investigate this matter. At such time, the chief official organs or the household and neighborhood association head will share equally the responsibility for that crime [harboring traitors] and will be dealt with according to the law.⁶²

This new tracking method required that all citizens police each other and subject themselves to principles of collective responsibility (*lien-tso-fa*).

According to the provincial government, the police and the Garrison Command were to enforce the census regulation.⁶³ Many of the individuals taken away for questioning by the police were never seen again. For instance, the head of the Faculty of Letters at National Taiwan University, Lin Mao-sheng, was executed because his name allegedly appeared on a document stating that he would be the Minister of Education in the independent Taiwan government.⁶⁴ Wang T'ien-teng was executed because he "had incited people to occupy the Taiwan Broadcasting Station and had

appealed to the people to take over Taiwan and expel the Mainlanders" in order to establish an independent Taiwanese government.⁶⁵ Chang Chen, director of the Central Investigation Bureau, reported to Chiang Kai-shek that Wang T'ien-teng had been involved in the Taipei Youth Corps but provided no conclusive proof that Wang was a Communist. Among the many arrested during this period, few were found to be Communists.

Some of those arrested were incarcerated for long periods. Provincial Council member Kuo Kuo-chi was imprisoned for 120 days and finally released because there was insufficient evidence to charge him with any crime.⁶⁶ A well-known leader, Liao Wen-i, who had not participated in the Uprising, had lost the Taiwan mayoral race in the spring 1946 elections and had also failed to be elected to the Provincial Council by a single vote.⁶⁷ When he expressed his unhappiness about the elections and criticized the provincial administration, Ch'en I suspected him of urging others to participate in the Uprising and ordered his arrest.⁶⁸ Like many other intellectuals, Liao fled Taiwan for Japan and became a key leader in the Taiwan Independence Movement.

Among those arrested were Li Yu-pang, a former director of the Three Principles of the People Youth Corps (*San-min chu-i ch'ing-nien-t'uan*), and Communists named P'an Hua, Hua Yün-yu, Chang I-chih, Wang P'ing, and Lo Ching-mo.⁶⁹ In a cable to Chiang Kai-shek on March 29, 1947, Chang Chen reported that Li and his associates had been arrested in Taipei on March 15, hiding in a house on Yung-lo Street. The Youth Corps, which had sub-units operating in Kaohsiung and Taipei, had organized activities against the provincial government during the Uprising.

The Extent of the Terror

Estimates of the number of people killed by Nationalist forces range from 1,000 to 100,000. Although definitive data are not available, a tentative estimate can be made from scattered information and impressionistic evidence. For instance, P'eng Ming-min recalled a relative saying that when troop ships arrived in Keelung on March 10, "Soldiers on deck had begun strafing the shoreline and docking area even before the ships had reached the pier."⁷⁰ P'eng then gave his view of how the Uprising was put down in Keelung:

This began a reign of terror in the port town and in Taipei. As the Nationalist troops came ashore, they moved out quickly through Keelung streets, shooting and bayoneting men and boys, raping women and looting homes and shops. Some Formosans were seized and stuffed alive into burlap bags found piled up at the

sugar warehouse and were then simply tossed into the harbor. Others were merely tied up or chained before being thrown from the piers.⁷¹

Another account of the suppression was supplied by Huang Wu-tung, a Presbyterian minister and the vice-speaker of the Chia-i district council. In his memoirs, Huang described how Nationalist troops entered Chia-i city:

After Ch'en P's troops arrested Chia-i representatives (five of the eight-person delegation sent to meet the troops and ask them to disarm), the troops immediately left the airfield. They entered the city and began arresting many people and killing untold numbers. At the same time, everyone stopped speaking to one another and only nodded their heads in passing. Because everyone sensed the great danger, no one knew when he or she might be arrested. Among the young students, a large number had been killed in the suburbs and at Hung-mao-pei. Their bodies were then stacked in trucks, taken to a fountain, and pushed into the fountain as an example for the public. The Taiwanese had never seen such a display of cruelty. In one quick moment, our courage left us and we had no idea what to do. We could only stand idle and await death. The clever people who had realized what might happen had fled and saved their lives. As for those who had not fled, many never knew why they were arrested. When the Nationalist troops from the airfield entered the city, they immediately shot any persons they saw on the street. People bolted their doors and locked their windows, believing that what they could not see, they could not fear. Chia-i city became a dead city where neither a dog barked nor a chicken cackled. I can still visualize that episode, and it turns my heart cold; when I remember the events, my heart palpitates.⁷²

Most of the people who lost their lives were probably from around Keelung, Taipei, Chia-i, and Kaohsiung, where the Uprising and suppression were both severe. The tactic of shooting indiscriminately at people and houses had long been used by KMT troops and warlord armies on the Mainland when putting down opposition. Reports like that of the American journalist John W. Powell confirm that incoming troops, who had been given names of individuals to arrest and eliminate as suspected leaders of the Uprising, rounded up these and any other suspects and executed them immediately as an example to the public.⁷³

In Keelung, troops sprayed the wharfs and streets with gunfire, shooting anybody on sight, and the same probably occurred in Chia-i and other cities. News reporters described the many soldiers who behaved in a trigger-happy manner, killing innocent bystanders. When a journalist questioned an army colonel about these indiscriminate shootings, the officer replied:

When the army arrived in Taipei, there were some rioters who still fired their weapons and offered resistance. Therefore, the army was forced to take military action. Once any soldier found people in front of him, and he asked them for the

curfew password, the soldier fired his weapon if those people did not reply or gave the wrong password . . . or if they did not stop or replied incorrectly . . . they were shot and killed. Some young and middle-aged Taiwanese did not understand these wartime regulations or did not understand Mandarin. Our soldiers also did not understand the Minnan dialect, for when our troops questioned the Taiwanese, they simply did not understand, and continued walking. Our troops had no recourse but to shoot. Later, the higher echelon became aware of these mistakes and issued orders to correct them.⁷⁴

Presbyterian leaders in Kaohsiung and P'ing-tung districts reported the murder of innocent ministers and their children by Nationalist troops.⁷⁵ Chuang Chia-nung describes the grisly massacre in Kaohsiung that occurred after General P'eng Meng-chi ordered his troops to attack Kaohsiung city:

P'eng Meng-chi then ordered the Feng-shan troops to come and attack, and they continued killing people until March 8th. Night and day, the gunfire continued. On the streets and in the lanes and alleys there were dead bodies. Many bodies already were rotting, and blood still flowed from some. Nobody dared to go out to identify and claim them. In this way, corpses were strewn as far as Kaohsiung Mountain, and blood flowed into nearby Lake Hsi-tzu. Several thousands of people had been sacrificed, and in the end, the heroic struggle of Kaohsiung city's people had been cruelly suppressed by government troops.⁷⁶

In Hua-lien city, there was no such massacre, but not a few persons were killed under one circumstance or another.⁷⁷

In June 1947, a newspaper reported the following casualty estimates for the rebellion in Taichung: among public servants, 55 wounded and 4 killed; among ordinary citizens, 18 wounded and 2 killed.⁷⁸ Chiang Mu-yün, a reporter from the *Shanghai Shen-pao*, traveled in the region at this time and reported the same number of killed and wounded.⁷⁹ Chiang also claimed that in Chia-i district, Mainlander public servants suffered 11 dead and 51 wounded; the Taiwanese, 406 dead and 131 wounded, with another 5 missing.⁸⁰

As for casualties in the Kaohsiung area, Chiang Mu-yün reported that 31 officers and soldiers had been killed and wounded guarding warehouses, 14 had been declared missing, and 2 had been shot for insubordination.⁸¹ However, other reports of Kaohsiung's casualties say that four city councilmen (Wang Shih-ting, Huang Tz'u, Hsü Ch'iu-chung, and Ch'en Chin-neng) were shot to death, along with scores of others, either in the city hall auditorium or in their offices.⁸² For the P'ing-tung area, there is evidence that four people were killed and 59 wounded in fighting around the local airport.⁸³

Given such scattered impressionistic and numerical data, estimates of the total number of people killed by Nationalist forces from February 28 through May 1947 vary wildly. According to a recent Communist source, which draws upon a report submitted on April 1, 1947, by seven Taiwanese associations in Shanghai and Nanking to the Control Yüan of the Nationalist government, "The Kuomintang used military force to clean out all key elements [responsible for the February 28 Incident]; they killed untold numbers of innocent people, threw their corpses into the sea, and left their bodies in deserted fields; their number exceeded 50,000 dead."⁸⁴

Taiwanese revolutionary organizations in Japan and the United States, especially the United Formosans for Independence, later made greatly varying claims, ranging from 10,000 to 100,000.⁸⁵ Wang Yü-te even estimated that the true number was more than 100,000: "According to an official estimate of Taiwan's population in 1953, the official household registration records are unclear, with over 100,000 names missing. Obviously, that missing number must represent the number of those killed at the time of the Incident."⁸⁶

At the other extreme, a reporter who interviewed General Pai Ch'ung-hsi wrote in the *China Weekly Review* that the loss of life came to some 4,000 killed and wounded (2,104 dead and 1,556 wounded). This figure covered Mainlanders and Taiwanese, including officials and military personnel.⁸⁷ Pai, however, publicly denied that the total exceeded 2,000 and requested that the newspaper not quote him any more.⁸⁸ On March 31, 1947, the *Minneapolis Morning Tribune* carried a report by John W. Powell, who claimed that "a conservative estimate placed the number of Formosans killed at 5,000, with thousands more imprisoned."⁸⁹

Another low estimate—2,000–3,000 casualties—was made by Wang K'ang, a correspondent for the *Shang-hai hsin-wen-pao* (*Shanghai Daily News*).⁹⁰ Ch'iu Nien-t'ai, a member of the Control Yüan, stated, "In this Incident, quite a few Taiwanese were killed by some Mainlanders, but not so many as reported by the newspapers, and certainly not to the terrible extent that seems to have been reported."⁹¹ Ch'iu then said,

Still another unreliable report stated that the local authorities had released news of several thousand Mainlanders killed by the rioters. People also would say that during the rioting period the Taiwanese killed and wounded came to around 10,000. However, according to my investigations, in which I asked people on both sides, the actual figure was not even one-tenth of what the rumors stated, just a percentage of those rumored figures. Why, then, have the numbers been so exaggerated? Did people think that with more people dead they could claim justice for their side? This kind of exaggeration probably reflected the abnormal mentality of that time!⁹²

It is evident that whereas figures in the range of 2,000–3,000 are too low, those reaching 20,000, not to mention 100,000, are too high. One hundred thousand Taiwanese killed would have equaled one-sixtieth of Taiwan's population at that time, a rate of around 1,400 killed per day over a two-and-a-half month period. If such a horrendous bloodbath had occurred, there would be more personal testimony, especially about the destruction or burial of so many bodies.

Between these two kinds of unrealistic estimates are some in the vicinity of 10,000 Taiwanese killed. Powell and Kerr, an American consular general officer, suggest such a figure,⁹³ but their estimate may include persons who were only arrested and jailed.⁹⁴ In fact, there is evidence that the figure was below 10,000. When the two Monopoly Bureau officials, Fu Hsüeh-t'ung and Yeh Te-ken, were on trial for instigating the riot (they had handled a middle-aged woman, Lin Chiang-mai, and accidentally killed a bystander), the judge admonished them with these words: "You two stand charged with the crime of instigating a great riot in which the estimated number of dead and wounded came to over several thousand, with property damage amounting to over \$100 million old Taiwan dollars."⁹⁵ The judge never mentioned a figure close to 10,000 wounded and dead.

A central government report compiled shortly after the Uprising estimates total casualties at around 6,300.⁹⁶ Another, similar report blurs data on killed and wounded, and the categories do not specifically include Mainlanders (Table 10). Finally, we refer to the 1987 account of the Uprising written by Ho Han-wen, who accompanied the censorate official Yang Liang-kung to Taiwan to investigate the origins of the Uprising and to estimate the number of wounded and dead. Unlike Yang, who later fled to Taiwan, Ho remained in China to live under Communist rule. Thus, we can presume that he had no incentive to favor the KMT with a low figure.

Ho recalled that the Commander of the Kaohsiung Fortress Headquarters, General P'eng Meng-ch'i, had informed him that "From March 2 until March 13, during the violent fighting in Kaohsiung city the number of rebels (*pao-min*) killed was estimated on first account to have exceeded 2,500."⁹⁷ In the Taichung and Chia-i uprisings, "the ordinary people and soldiers fought for three days. The Taichung mayor, Huang K'o-li, and the Chia-i mayor, Ch'en Tung-sheng, reported that in the city and suburban areas of Taichung there were more than 800 corpses and in those of Chia-i over 700 corpses." After Nationalist troops arrived, "Ch'en I arrested and killed college and schoolteachers and students." On March 8 and 9, "around forty to fifty people were shot" in Taipei. Ho relates that, according to censor Yang Liang-kung's investigative report, "over

TABLE 10
*Estimated Dead and Wounded, by Category,
 at the Time of the February 28th Incident*

Category	Dead and Wounded
1. Various organs resisting the central government	142
2. Provincial, district, city, and Party headquarters participants	8
3. Branches of youth groups	27
4. Taiwan province, district, and city activists	174
5. National Assembly, censorate, and national representatives	17
6. Police officials and policemen	33
7. Communists and other radicals	283
8. Taipei high school and college teachers and students	75
9. Red Bomb group	46
10. Other extremists	10
11. Love Taiwan Association	11
12. Min-sheng Association	9
13. District and city protesters	3,230
14. Arrested, convicted, or executed	2,252
Total	6,317

SOURCE: *Pao-an ssu-ling-pu* [Security Headquarters] (1956), pp. 32–33.

500 Taipei city people died.” P’ing-tung’s mayor, Kung Lü-tuan, reported that around 400 to 500 people died. Ho gives an overall estimate of between 7,000 and 8,000 dead, and with wounded included, a total casualty list of around 10,000 persons.⁹⁸

Some, but not all, of these people were members of Taiwan’s elite. The list of those who were arrested (24) or lost their lives (45), often only for making critical remarks about the administration, is incomplete, but it indicates the range of human talent that was snuffed out or incarcerated. (See Table 11.) Yet, as we have already noted, there is no basis for the common claim that the Nationalists killed all or most of the Taiwanese elite. We can assume that around 325,000 people, or 5 percent of Taiwan’s population of 6.5 million or more in 1947, were members of the elite. Even an overly cautious estimate of 1 percent of the population yields 65,000. If we conclude that 8,000 persons at most were killed and that half that number were members of the elite (as illustrated by the individuals cited in Table 11), we can surmise that 0.012 percent of the elite were killed.

Who was responsible for the slaughter of so many innocent people? We know that Chiang Kai-shek and Ch’en I had instructed their subordinates to avoid reprisals and to minimize bloodshed. Ch’en I did not feel any responsibility, as one of his colleagues learned while serving with Ch’en in Chekiang after the Uprising. Ch’en said:

The Uprising occurred because I was extremely frank and I believed too much in myself. Yet I lacked a certain political caution. Because I wanted good relations between the people and the military, I sent back to the Mainland the undisciplined troops that had been stationed in Taiwan. I never dreamed that the troops that later returned to Taiwan would behave so vindictively in suppressing the people—they should not have acted in that way. I am extremely saddened by their actions, and I believe that most people, including the Taiwanese, will be able to understand me.⁹⁹

Ch’en I felt sorrow but considered himself blameless in the brutal suppression of the Uprising. In fact, Chiang Kai-shek and Ch’en I could not have been expected to control those division and regimental commanders and officers who rounded up and shot citizens, secretly disposed of their bodies, and strafed residences and shops.

We have little information from participants or observers except for the occasional memoir like that of Ho P’ing-ju (which must be treated with caution because it is the only account by a military participant that we have found). Ho was a high-ranking officer on the staff of the Twenty-first Army, which had been sent from Shanghai to Keelung on the evening of March 8. Ho points out that the troops were extremely undisciplined. When the 438th Regiment of the 146th Division had been mustered at Woosung Harbor before leaving the Mainland, officers and soldiers had carelessly discarded their cigarettes, setting off a fire that nearly detonated the ammunition being loaded onto the ship.¹⁰⁰ When the 438th Regiment drew into Keelung harbor, these same soldiers began strafing the shore, where people had gathered to watch the ships, and “many people were shot and bled profusely, human organs spilled onto the ground, and not even women and children were spared.”¹⁰¹ Ho does not say whether officers aboard the ship had been informed of fighting in the city and for this reason landed with guns blazing.

Ho’s examples underscore the undisciplined troop behavior revealed by another incident. The following day, after the same troops had moved into Taipei, they occupied Taipei Normal School, where Ho claims that members of their families, who had accompanied them to Taiwan, were bivouacked with them. The family members tore out window frames, using them and furniture to build fires, and dismantled electrical wiring and stole light bulbs.¹⁰²

Ho also recalls that General P’eng Meng-chi, the commander of the Kaohsiung Fortress Headquarters, was so angered by the Uprising that he decided to teach the local insurgents a lesson as soon as he learned that Nationalist troops were on their way to Taiwan.¹⁰³ P’eng thus ordered the massacres in Kaohsiung and Tainan. Ho quotes him as saying, “Do not worry about killing a few people by mistake. I will bear the respon-

TABLE II
Members of the Taiwanese Elite Arrested or Killed
in the Taiwan Uprising and Its Suppression

Name	Arrested or killed	Profession and/or status
Chan Jung-an	arrested	Councilman, Kaohsiung District Council
Chang Ch'i-lang	killed	Physician and National Assemblyman
Chang Chung-jen	killed	Principal of Hua-lien High School [Chang Ch'i-lang's eldest son]
Chang Kuo-jen	killed	Teacher, Hua-lien High School [Chang Ch'i-lang's third son]
Ch'en Chang-keng	arrested	Secretary, Taichung Appellate Court
Ch'en Hsin	killed	President, Board of Trustees, Taiwan Trust and Ta-kung Enterprise Co.
Ch'en Ch'eng-po	killed	Artist; Councilman, Chia-i City Council
Ch'en Hua-chung	arrested	Speaker, Tainan District Council
Ch'en Kun-lun	arrested	Councilman, Kaohsiung District Council
Ch'en Shih-jung	arrested	Public prosecutor, Taichung Appellate Court
Ch'en Fu-chih	killed	General director, Chia-i Branch, San-min Chu-i Youth Corps
Ch'en Neng-t'ung	killed	Principal, Tamsui High School
Ch'en Wan-fu	arrested	Councilman, Taichung District Council
Ch'en Wu	killed	Councilman, Taipei City Council
Cheng Ssu-ch'uan	arrested	Lecturer, Taiwan Technology College
Cheng Sung-yün	arrested	Public prosecutor, Hua-lien Court
Chien Ch'en-yü	arrested	Councilman, Taipei City Council
Chiu Chin-shan	killed	Director, Kaohsiung branch, <i>T'ai-wan hsin-sheng-pao</i>
Chuang Ch'ui-sheng	arrested	Director, Taichung Provincial Library
Chuang Meng-hou	arrested	General director, Tainan Branch, San-min Chu-i Youth Corps
Huang A-ch'un	killed	Teacher, Tamsui High School
Huang Ch'ao-sheng	killed	Councilman, Taipei City Council; physician
Huang Ma-tien	killed	Standing member, Taiwan Provincial Merchant United Association
Huang Shih	killed	Councilman, Kaohsiung City Council
Huang Shih-ch'iao	arrested	Director, Hsin-chu District Library
Huang Ting-ho	arrested	Councilman, Taipei City Council
Hsü Ch'iu	killed	Councilman, Kaohsiung City Council
Hsü Ch'un-ch'ing	killed	Councilman, Taipei City Council
Hsü Hsi-ch'ien	killed	General director, Hua-lien Branch, San-min Chu-i Youth Corps
Hung Yüeh-pai	arrested	Councilman, Taiwan Provincial Council
Jao I-jen	arrested	Director, Chia-i branch, <i>Ho-p'ing jih-pao</i>
Jao Wei-yüeh	arrested	Director, Taichung Appellate Court
Juan Chao-jih	killed	General manager, <i>T'ai-wan hsin-sheng pao</i>
K'o Lin	killed	Councilman, Chia-i City Council
Ku-shang T'ai-lang	killed	Physician
Kuo Chang-k'uang	killed	Director, Taiwan Provincial I-lan Hospital
Kuo Kuo-chi	arrested	Councilman, Taiwan Provincial Council
Kuo Wan-chih	arrested	Councilman, Kaohsiung City Council
Lai Keng-sung	killed	Judge, Hua-lien Court
Lai Yüan-hui	arrested	Director, Taichung Prison
Li Chin-tsung	arrested	Councilman, Kaohsiung City Council
Li Jen-kuei	killed	Councilman, Taipei City Council
Li Jui-feng	killed	Lawyer

TABLE II
Continued

Name	Arrested or killed	Profession and/or status
Li Jui-han	killed	Lawyer
Liao Chin-p'ing	killed	Standing Committee member, Political Construction Association
Lin Chieh	killed	Kaohsiung resident
Lin Chieh	killed	Director, <i>T'ai-wan Hsin-sheng-pao</i> Printing Shop
Lin Hu	arrested	Councilman, Taichung District Council
Lin Jih-kao	arrested	Councilman, Taiwan Provincial Council
Lin Ko-sheng	arrested	Vice-director, Taichung Fire Department
Lin Kuei-tuan	killed	Lawyer
Lin Lien-ch'eng	arrested	Councilman, Taichung City Council
Lin Lien-chung	killed	National Assemblyman; Councilman, Taiwan Provincial Council; lawyer
Lin Mao-sheng	killed	Dean, College of Liberal Arts, National Taiwan University; publisher of <i>Min pao</i> ; National Councilman
Lin Chung-hsien	arrested	National Councilman; president of the Board of Trustees, <i>Chung-wai jih-pao</i>
Lin Yu-fu	arrested	Secretary, Taichung Appellate Court
Lo Shui-yüan	arrested	Councilman, Taipei City Council
Lu Ping-ch'in	killed	Councilman, Chia-i City Council
Ma Yu-yüeh	arrested	Councilman, Taiwan Provincial Council
Pan Ch'ü-yüan	arrested	Vice-speaker, Taipei City Council
Pan Mu-chih	killed	Councilman, Chia-i City Council
Shih Chiang-nan	killed	Physician; founder of Ssu-fang Hospital
Su Hsien-chang	killed	Director, Chia-i branch, <i>T'ai-wan hsin-sheng pao</i>
Su Yao-pang	killed	Principal, I-lan Agricultural School
Sung Fei-ju	killed	Publisher, <i>Jen-min tao-pao</i> ; former vice-director, Education Dept., Taiwan Provincial Administrative Executive Office
Tang Te-chang	killed	Lawyer; director, Tainan Human Rights Protection Commission
Ts'ai Tieh-ch'eng	arrested	Journalist, <i>Ho-p'ing jih-pao</i>
Ts'ai Ting-tsan	arrested	Councilman, Tainan District Council
Ts'ai Yü-pei	arrested	Secretary, Taichung Appellate Court
Tseng Feng-ming	killed	Kaohsiung resident
T'u Kuang-ming	killed	Head, Japanese Property Investigation Office, Kaohsiung city
Wang Shih-ting	killed	Councilman, Kaohsiung City Council
Wang T'ien-teng	killed	Councilman, Taiwan Provincial Council; chairman, Taiwan Provincial Tea Association
Wang Yü-lin	killed	Former public prosecutor, Hsin-chu Court; teacher, Chien-kuo High School
Wu Chin-lien	killed	Editor-in-chief, Japanese section, <i>T'ai-wan hsin-sheng pao</i>
Wu Hsin-jung	arrested	Councilman, Tainan District Council
Wu Hung-ch'i	killed	Judge, Taipei High Court
Yang Yüan-ting	killed	Vice-speaker, Keelung City Council
Yeh Ch'iu-mu	killed	Vice-speaker, P'ing-tung City Council
Yeh Tso-le	arrested	Judge, Taichung Court

SOURCE: Chuang Chia-nung, *Fen-nü i T'ai-wan*, pp. 132-34.

sibility."¹⁰⁴ Again, Ho's memoir can be corroborated by accounts of foreigners in Taipei. Our sources are silent, however, about who provided the lists of people for Nationalist troops to arrest, imprison, and even shoot.

As the terror continued, many influential Taiwanese petitioned the central government to order provincial officials, police officers, and troops to stop the arrests and killings. The censor Ch'en Chiang-shan appealed to the Control Yuan of the central government, asking it to send a high-ranking official to investigate conditions in Taiwan. In Kaohsiung, officials of the administration, police officers, and members of the Garrison Command held weekly meetings to discuss how to avoid another uprising. At one meeting, a local leader, Lin Chia, even asked General P'eng Meng-chi whether "many Mainlanders had taken this opportunity to seek revenge." General P'eng failed to respond. The leading censor for Fukien and Taiwan, Yang Liang-kung, personally requested that the Nanking government order the Taiwan provincial government to stop these repressive activities:

Taiwan martial law has been suspended and mopping-up operations have ceased. These orders have been publicly announced by the Taiwan provincial government. As for the February 28 Incident, the Taiwan Provincial Garrison Command Headquarters ordered all people arrested to be placed on trial. Normalcy is supposed to have returned. However, I have recently received many reports that the military authority has used the February 28 Incident as a pretext to continue arresting people in all districts and cities. Those who were arrested after martial law was suspended have not yet been put on trial by the judiciary. These actions obviously contradict the Taiwan provincial government's orders and are against the central government's principles for handling the Taiwan incident. I ask you to order the Garrison Command Headquarters to issue orders to all local military authorities to obey the law and to immediately send those arrested to trial. Hereafter, no one should use the Incident as a pretext to arrest people or execute them willfully. Such evil trends should cease. . . .¹⁰⁵

Although the central government had forbidden reprisals after suppressing the Uprising,¹⁰⁶ those orders had not been obeyed. The voices appealing to the central government for leniency attest to that. Along with the other evidence we have cited, including that concerning P'eng Meng-chi's role, the data show that much of the killing was against the orders of the Generalissimo and Ch'en I. Data that have eluded us, however, may show precisely just who ordered and did what.

Moving Toward Reform

After completing his investigations, General Pai Ch'ung-hsi flew to Nanking on April 2 and reported to Chiang Kai-shek, giving his reasons for the

occurrence of the Uprising and his ideas for repairing the damage. General Pai presented four recommendations on how the central government should deal with the Uprising.¹⁰⁷

Pai recommended that Taiwan's political structure be reformed in two significant ways. First, the central government should abolish the title of Taiwan Provincial Administrative Executive Office and establish the Taiwan Provincial Government with an administrative structure similar to that of other provinces. That change required creating more departments and sections within the administration. Second, the central government's Ministry of the Interior should have standard procedures for electing heads of all districts and cities and members of the provincial council, as well as rules for how long they should serve. Pai also urged that these legal procedures for establishing the elections be implemented quickly in order to hold elections in Taiwan as soon as possible.

Pai also recommended some new administrative rules for the provincial government. Taiwan's provincial governor should not head the Taiwan Garrison Command Headquarters. More Taiwanese should fill top provincial administrative positions and head departments, bureaus, and sections. Salaries for Taiwanese and Mainlanders should be equal for the same administrative post.

Pai also suggested economic reforms, saying that private and publicly owned enterprises should be separated, and the power of the latter greatly reduced. The Ministry of Economics and the Resource Commission should be responsible for making certain this separation occurred. The Executive Yuan and the central government should send delegates to all branches of the Taiwan provincial government to check on the progress of these economic reforms and to determine whether further changes were required.

The urban Resolution Committees and the other organizations that had mushroomed during the Uprising already had been abolished. Pai proposed that any people connected with these groups and the Uprising should be dealt with in a most lenient way according to the law. Any Communist Party members who had been apprehended as instigating the riots should be severely punished. Nearly all of Pai's recommendations were carried out over the next two years.

On April 21, Chiang Kai-shek wired Ch'en I that Wei Tao-ming had been selected as the new governor of Taiwan and would officially take charge on May 15.¹⁰⁸ He instructed Ch'en I not to appoint any personnel on his own and to order all military units to remain where they were at that time. As for any lower-level appointments, Chiang wanted to be informed of them before April 23. On the same day, Wei Tao-ming offered his suggestions to Chiang Kai-shek on how the new provincial admin-

istration should be staffed and on the appointments to be publicly announced.¹⁰⁹

On May 15, 1947, Taiwan's special administrative status was ended with the abolition of the Taiwan Provincial Administrative Executive Office, the single organ in which great power had been concentrated. Ch'en I had already begun hiring more Taiwanese for the new administration, and more entered the administration after he was replaced on April 29 by Wei Tao-ming.¹¹⁰

Born in 1899, Wei Tao-ming had served with distinction as mayor of Nanking, Secretary-General of the Executive Yüan, and Ambassador to the United States (1942-46).¹¹¹ Upon his arrival, Wei traveled around the island to talk with officials and local leaders, learn about local conditions, and improve Taiwanese-Mainlander relations.

On May 16, Wei wired Chiang Kai-shek that everything was moving according to plan.¹¹² In addition to discussing the large issue of provincial reform, Wei commented that some weapons had apparently disappeared during the Uprising and that some prisoners had escaped from jail. For these reasons, Governor Wei had ordered security to be tightened and had asked P'eng Meng-chi to look into the matter. P'eng Meng-chi immediately informed Chiang, "Regarding the weapons lost during the Incident, the Garrison Command has announced a reward for those who return them. Until now, we have recovered 216 rifles (more than the original number lost). Except for a few handguns, almost all of the weapons have been recovered by the military."¹¹³ P'eng also said that all efforts were being made to recapture those prisoners who had escaped.

Wei remained governor until replaced by Ch'en Ch'eng on January 5, 1949. During his administration, the economic structure underwent radical change. The name of the Monopoly Bureau was changed to the Public Sales Bureau (*Kung-mai-chü*), and the bureau was revamped by restricting the number of commodities it could sell to retailers. The Trade Bureau was renamed the Commodity Supply Bureau (*Wu-tzu kung-ying-chü*) and streamlined its handling of "all commodities sold abroad and produced by publicly owned enterprises, their acquisition of machines and raw materials, and their sales to meet the demands of private enterprises."¹¹⁴ The reform of these two bureaus greatly increased the number of private enterprises producing and distributing consumer goods and allowed Taiwanese business people to conduct their affairs with more freedom and certainty than before.

State-owned enterprises became responsible for producing mainly intermediate products, while the private sector specialized in the production of consumer goods. This step, along with the sale of public land to farmers,

helped to prevent rising unemployment and gradually increased the production of goods and services, even though inflation worsened.

In addition to giving new encouragement to the private sector, reforms increased the role of Taiwanese in the provincial political structure. Of the eleven new provincial commissioners established, seven were Taiwanese. More Taiwanese became heads and deputies of administration departments: Ch'iu Nien-t'ai, Department Director of Civil Affairs; Ch'iu Pints'un, Deputy Director of the Department of Finance; Hsieh Tung-ming, Deputy Director of the Department of Education; Ch'en Shang-wen, Deputy Director of the Reconstruction Department; Hsü Ch'ing-ch'un, Director of Agriculture and Forestry; and Yen Ch'un-hui, Director of Sanitation. For the first time, a few Taiwanese entered the highest levels of the administration.¹¹⁵

However, under Governor Wei Tao-ming's administration, the investigations and trials of those charged with participation in the Uprising continued to drag on. In January 1948, Chiang Kai-shek's secretary, Wu Ting-ch'ang, reported to Chiang that high-ranking Taiwanese were concerned about expediting these trials.¹¹⁶ Wu urged Chiang to use his authority to speed up these trials, and he appealed for leniency on behalf of Taiwan Provincial Council members Chiang Wei-ch'uan and Lin Jih-kao, asking that they be released from prison because the Taiwan Provincial Government had offered to guarantee their innocence. Wu argued that Chiang and Lin were prominent Taiwanese, not guilty of any crimes during the Uprising, and people who could help to win popular support for the provincial government.

In March 1948, Chiang and Lin were still in prison, and many high-ranking officials again appealed to Chiang Kai-shek for their speedy release.¹¹⁷ On June 4, 1948, Hsieh Kuan-sheng, head of the Department of Justice, reported to Chiang Kai-shek that both Chiang and Lin had finally been released because of no conclusive evidence of their guilt.¹¹⁸ No doubt, there were many more instances in which people were wrongfully arrested but eventually released, or, once arrested, were not quickly put on trial and so remained in prison for a long period.